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THE OIL AND GAS LEASE-MAJOR PROBLEMS
Maurice H. Merrill*
I. INTRODUCTION
What is an oil and gas lease? We may start with the proposi-
tion that it is not a conventional lease of real property at all.1
Unlike that document, 2 it does not create the relation of landlord
and tenant between the grantor and the grantee.3 Where the con-
ventional lease "implies an estate in the real property, for the
time being, an ownership pro hac vice,' 4 the oil lease "does not
constitute a conveyance of lands, tenements, or other realty, or
of a freehold or corporeal interest therein."5  Whereas, under the
ordinary lease, the lessee becomes entitled to the immediate
possession of the premises6 and may exclude therefrom the
world, 7 including his landlord s the oil and gas lessee has no
* B.A. 1919, LL.B. 1922, University of Oklahoma; S.J.D. 1925, Harvard
Law School. Author, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES (2d
ed. 1940); LAW OF NoTICE (1952); CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRA-
TrVE LAW (1954); THE PUBLIC'S CONCERN WITH THE FUEL MINERALS
(1960). Member, from Oklahoma, National Conference on Uniform
State Laws since 1944. Member, Judicial Council of Oklahoma since
1945. Presently, Research Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma
College of Law.
1 Huston v. Cox, 103 Kan. 73, 172 Pac. 992 (1918); Staplin v. Vesely,
41 N.M. 543, 72 P.2d 7 (1937); Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177
Pac. 86, 3 A.L.R. 352 (1918).
2 Clark v. Harry, 182 Va. 410, 29 S.E.2d 231 (1944); Golden v. Mount,
32 Wash. 2d 653, 203 P.2d 667 (1949).
3 Concord Oil & Gas Co. v. Thompson, 248 Mich. 230, 226 N.W. 857
(1929); Shell Oil Co. v. Howth, 138 Tex. 357, 159 S.W.2d 483 (1942).
4 Bowley v. Fuller, 121 Me. 22, 115 Atl. 466, 24 A.L.R. 964 (1921). "A
* lease of real estate is a hiring or renting of it for a certain time for
a named consideration." Hampton v. Struve, 160 Neb. 305, 311, 70
N.W.2d 74, 75 (1955).
5 State v. Shamblin, 185 Okla. 126, 90 P.2d 1053 (1939).
6 Canaday v. Krueger, 156 Neb. 287, 56 N.W.2d 123 (1952).
7 Gregory v. Pribbeno, 143 Neb. 379, 9 N.W.2d 485 (1943); Papadopulos
v. Defabrizio, 102 Utah 84, 125 P.2d 416 (1942).
8 Wurm v. Allen Cadillac Co., 301 Mass. 413, 17 N.E.2d 305 (1938);
Vance v. Henderson, 141 Neb. 766, 4 N.W.2d 833 (1942); Golde Clothes
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right to enter except to carry on the mineral operations which
are the subject of the lease,9 and he may not prevent the use of
the demised property by the lessor,10 unless that use interferes
with his own authorized activities." While the conventional
lease usually is construed most strongly against the landlord, 12
the oil and gas lease is construed most strongly against the
lessee.1 3 One court admirably has expressed some of the differ-
ences between the two classes of instruments in the following
language:
Oil and gas leases differ from the ordinary and well known
forms of leases in existence and heretofore construed in this state
such as leases on city property and agricultural and grazing lands,
in that, in the latter classes of leases valuable property rights are
at once acquired by the lessee and immediate possession usually
yielded by the lessor, and the occupancy by the lessee either im-
proves, or at least does not materially injure, the leased premises;
he gets no right to take away any part of the soil, and during the
term of the lease, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances,
the value of the property remains reasonably stable, while, on the
other hand, no particular value attaches to an oil and gas lease
until after development and the production of oil or gas in paying
quantities. The holding of a lease for this latter purpose, without
prospecting or operating, inures only to the benefit of the lessee
as a speculator, and possession of the premises is -not usually
yielded at once, and, when yielded, the lessor usually retains pos-
session of the larger part of the surface ground. When the lessee
finally takes possession and commences operations, the lessor's
lands may be riddled with holes and cluttered with derricks and
other paraphernalia of the business, to the great detriment of the
Shop v. Loew's Buffalo Theatres, 236 N.Y. 465, 141 N.E. 917, 30 A.L.R.
931 (1923).
0 Concord Oil & Gas Co. v. Thompson, 248 Mich. 230, 226 N.W. 857 (1929).
1o Standard Oil Co. v. Oil Well Salvage Co., 170 Ark. 729, 281 S.W. 360
(1926) (gathering stations); Brookshire Oil Co. v. Casmalia Ranch
Oil & Dev. Co., 156 Cal. 211, 103 Pac. 927 (1909) (pipe line); Gulf
Pipe Line Co. v. Pawnee-Tulsa Petroleum Co., 34 Okla. 775, 127 Pac.
252, 41 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1108 (1912) (pumping station manifold pit);
Cosden Oil & Gas Co. v. Hickman, 114 Okla. 86, 243. Pac. 226 (1925)
(townsite development).
" Conway v. Skelly Oil Co., 54 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1931) (buildings and
other improvements inconsistent with authorized developmental activ-
ities); Cozart v. Crenshaw, 299 S.W. 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) (re-
finery).
12 Otting v. Gradsky, 294 Ky. 779, 172 S.W.2d 554, 148 A.L.R. 580 (1943);
Golden v. Mount, 32 Wash. 2d 653, 203 P.2d 667 (1949).
13 Hill v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 119 Colo. 477, 205 P.2d 643 (1949);
Schumacher v. Cole, 131 Mont. 166, 309 P.2d 311 (1957); Fritsche v.
Turner, 133 Neb. 633, 276 N.W. 403 (1937); Berton v. Coss, 139 Okla.
42, 280 Pac. 1093 (1929).
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lessor and damage to the property, if oil or gas be not discovered.
If oil or gas is discovered, the lessee carries away a valuable part
of the real estate itself. Thornton on Oil & Gas, p. 152. Again,
the value of property declared in such a lease, is subject to violent
fluctuations, and any substantial delay, either in commencing drill-
ing operations or in prosecuting such operations thereafter with
diligence, may render land, theretofore extremely valuable for its
potential oil and gas rights, absolutely valueless.14
What, then, is this instrument, if it is not a lease? Function-
ally, it is a document designed to facilitate the development of the
petroliferous resources in the described premises, a task which
ordinarily the landowner is not in a position to undertake, 15 by
granting to the lessee the privilege to enter the premises, to
search for these resources, and to produce them and to take
them into his possession if they are discovered. In view of the
speculative nature of the venture, the major part of the con-
sideration to the lessor neither is paid at the outset nor is its
amount fixed definitely. Instead, the chief remuneration is af-
forded by payments proportionate to the productivity of the
premises, termed royalty. 16
Originating from primitively drafted documents,' 7 modeled
after the conventional lease of real estate' s or modifications
thereof already in use for the exploitation of solid minerals,' 9
lease forms have passed through numerous stages. Since the
printed forms are prepared by, or for the use of, those seeking
to acquire operating rights, most of the changes have been in-
itiated in response to the felt needs of the lessees, seeking
either to overcome disappointing judicial decisions 20 or to frame
'4 Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 76 Mont. 254, 246 Pac. 168 (1926).
15 See MERRILL, THE PUBLIC'S CONCERN WITH THE FUEL MINERALS 15 (1960).
16 Royalty is "a share of the product or proceeds therefrom, reserved
to the owner for permitting another to use the property." Carroll v.
Bowen, 180 Okla. 215, 217, 68 P.2d 773, 775 (1937). It also has been
defined as "the share of oil and gas to be received by the lessor by
the operation of the lease." Davis v. Hurst, 150 Kan. 130, 132, 90 P.2d
1100, 1101, 122 A.L.R. 957, 959 (1939).
17 Examples of early lease forms may be found in BROWN, OIL AND GAS
LEASES 1 (1958); Moses, The Evolution and Development of the Oil and
Gas Lease, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 2D ANNUAL INST. ON OIL
& GAS L. & TAX 1, 6, 7, 38 (1951).
18 There is the testimony of contemporary comment: "The discovery of
petroleum led to new forms of leasing land." Brown v. Vandergrift,
80 Pa. 142, 145 (1875).
19 For an early example of a solid mineral arrangement see Barney v.
Sutton, 2 Watts 31 (Pa. 1833).
20 See BROWN, OIL AND GAS LEASES 112 (1958). Other examples will be
found throughout the work cited.
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provisions adapted to changes in the oil business.21 Occasionally,
lessors have sufficient knowledge and bargaining ability to in-
troduce modifications in the forms presented to them. Generally,
however, the preservation of lessors' interests has been achieved
by judicial interpretation in the course of litigation, often ac-
companied by anguished protest from the lessee interests that
the courts in effect are legislating rather than construing.22 It
is difficult, though, to see how the judges could have avoided
this task. Long-term interests of landowners and oil operators
may coincide in general. 23 Specifically and immediately, however,
they are often in conflict.24 The oil operator, particularly in these
days of integrated enterprise, tends to think that he should be able
to conduct his activities in the manner of a well-managed indus-
trial operation.25 He forgets that he does not "own" his "factory"
and that others possess beneficial interests in the product.20 Con-
versely, the landowner often feels that maximum return to him
should be the lessee's sole objective. Inevitably, the arbitrament
of the judges must resolve the conflicts thus engendered and, in
the process, must develop a system of law designed to realize,
as completely as is possible in consistence with the general wel-
fare, the objectives of all parties.27
Because of the empiric manner in which it has developed,
the typical oil and gas lease has little to recommend it, either
as a literary composition or as an example of master draftsman-
ship.28 It is too long, over-wordy, and poorly organized. It is full
of inconsistencies and contradictions, thereby multiplying the
opportunities for judicial construction or misconstruction. Yet,
because so many decisions have given it effect in one way or
another, no one bent on reform dares to abandon the past and
concoct a simpler, shorter, more logical document. Instead, words
21 See Moses, supra note 17, at 18 for examples.
22 As in BROWN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 80, 168, 243, 301, or in Veasey,
The Law of Oil and Gas, 18 MICH. L. REV. 652, 660 (1920).
23 See BROWN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 335.
24 See Merrill, Book Review, 12 OKLA. L. REv. 193, 195 (1959).
25 Cf. Veasey, supra note 22, at 652, 655, 659.
26 Cf. MERRILL, THE PuBLIc's CONCERN WITH THE FUEL MINERALS 16 (1960).
27 See 3 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE § 81 (1959).
28 Lease forms are collected in KULP, CASES ON OL Amw GAS 835-48 (3d
ed. 1947); WILLImS, MAxWELL & MEYERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 739-49 (1956); DONLEY, LAW OF COAL, OIL
AND GAS N WEST VIRGINIA AND ViRGINIA 263-301 (1951); BROWN, OIL
AND GAS LEASES 417-542 (1958); 7 SUMMEms, OIL Am GAS 12-319
(perm. ed. 1939), with others in current pocket supplements.
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are altered. New phrases, clauses, sentences or sections are
added. The crazy old structure remains, like a house which has
been built onto, time and again.29 The result merits a comment
similar to that made by a British judge concerning another legal
document, to the effect that: "no one, I am sure, by the light of
nature ever understood an English mortgage of real estate. '30 The
judges give a variety of names to the interests created by it.31
The most accurate term seems to be "profit A prendre.113 2 If we
may not understand the oil and gas lease by the light of nature,
let us try to understand a few of its major features by the light
of the decisions.
II. WHO MAY LEASE
We start with the proposition that, in the American property
system, the landowner's domain, in its normal condition, extends,
in accordance with the old maxim, "ad coelum et ad inferos,"' 33
so that "the owner of the surface is an owner downward to the
center, until the underlying strata have been severed from the
surface by sale.13 4  Obviously, until such a severance has been
effected, whether by sale or otherwise, the surface owner ordi-
narily is the proper person to make a lease.3 5
A. GUARDIANS AND TRUSTEES
But the owner may be an infant, insane or otherwise under
legal disability. The legal effect of a lease by such a person, who
29 Forms, often differing only in minor particulars, are almost infinite
in number. One collection included nearly 200 documents in 1951.
See Terry, Miscellaneous Clauses in Oil and Gas Leases, SOUTHWESTERN
LEGAL FOUNDATION 2D ANNUAL INST. ON OI. & GAS L. & TAX 237 (1951).
30 Lord MacNaghten in Samuel v. Jarrah Timber & Wood Paving Corp.,
(1904] A.C. 323, 326.
S1 For an enumeration of the various terms, see KULP, CASES ON OIL AND
GAS 175 (3rd ed. 1947).
32 Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P.2d 788, 101 A.L.R. 871 (1935);
Burden v. Gypsy Oil Co., 141 Kan. 147, 40 P.2d 463 (1935); Williard v.
Federal Sur. Co., 91 Mont. 465, 8 P.2d 633 (1932); Rich v. Doneghey,
71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86, 3 A.L.R. 352 (1918). See Shokes, Possible
Treatment in Nebraska of a Lessee's Interest Under an Oil and Gas
Lease, 31 NB. L. REV. 374, 398 (1952).
33 Doe v. Burt, 1 T. R. 701, 99 Eng. Rep. 1330 (1787); Sargent v. Adams,
69 Mass. (3 Gray) 72, 63 Am. Dec. 718 (1854).
34 Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 27 Atl. 714, 22 L.R.A. 141 (1893).
35 Gillespie v. Iseman, 210 Pa. 6, 59 Atl. 266 (1904) (successor in interest
may not derogate from the terms); Knotts v. McGregor, 47 W. Va. 566,
35 S.E. 899 (1900) (exclusion of lessee by lessor, attempting repudia-
tion).
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is not under guardianship, depends upon whether the incapacity
is such as to render his contracts void or merely voidable.3 6 A
legally appointed guardian of the estate of such a person, if au-
thorized by statute to sell the ward's real estate, and with appro-
priate approval by the proper court,37 may execute an oil and
gas lease.38  Where the guardian's powers are derived solely from
his general authority over the ward's realty, however, there is
a division of opinion as to whether the lease which he executes
can endure after the ward has achieved capacity. The judges
who deny the power stress the interference with a fully capaci-
tated owner's dominion over his estate.39 Those taking the con-
trary view point out that the established habits of the oil business
require the execution of leases which may be of indefinite dura-
tion and that the realization of generous bonuses and the effec-
tive protection against drainage by neighboring wells may be
thwarted if the guardian cannot execute such a lease.40 This
latter reasoning seems the more convincing. To clear up any
doubt, statutes should authorize expressly the execution of leases
in the appropriate form. A number have been enacted 41 and
there seems no reason to doubt their constitutionality.42
30 See BRowN, On. AND GAS LEASES §§ 2.04, 2.05 (1958); KULP, Om AND
GAS RiGHTs §§ 10.16, 10.23 (1954), and authorities cited in these works.
37 As to the necessity of court authority: Ardizzonne v. Archer, 71 Okla.
289, 160 Pac. 446 (1916); South Penn Oil Co. v. McIntire, 44 W. Va.
296, 28 S.E. 922 (1898).
38 Newell v. McMillan, 139 Kan. 94, 30 P.2d 126 (1934); Henderson v.
Shell Oil Co., 202 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
39 York v. Warren Oil & Gas Co., 191 Ky. 157, 29 S.W. 114 (1921); Miles
v. Amerada Petroleum Corp. 241 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
40 Cabin Valley Mining Co. v. Hall, 53 Okla. 760, 155 Pac. 570 (1916),
1916F L.R.A. 493.
41 See for example NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 57-210 to -212.01 (Reissue 1960);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 924-27 (1951); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 929.1-.5
(Supp. 1959).
42 Jones v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 273 U.S. 195 (1927). There was a
declaration of invalidity as to such a statute under the Kentucky Con-
stitution in Lawrence E. Tierney Coal Co. v. Smith's Guardian, 180
Ky. 815, 203 S.W. 735, modified on rehearing, 181 Ky. 764, 205 S.W.
951, 4 A.L.R. 1540 (1918). However, on rehearing the decision was
confined to coal leases and the question as to oil and gas leases was
expressly reserved. The citator indicates no decision since upon
the point reserved. All concerned may have assumed the point as
disposed of by the federal ruling, or it may be that the state court's
reservation of the question has been taken as establishing a distinction.
It hardly seems likely that occasions for guardians to execute such
leases have ceased in Kentucky.
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In the absence of statute, the personal representatives of a
deceased owner,43 or trustees44 may not lease real estate for oil
and gas unless they are acting under an instrument giving them
power to do so. 45 Authority to sell,46 particularly where coupled
with a general power of management of the property,47 usually
is construed to give power to lease for mineral exploitation. Be-
cause of the difference between the use made of premises by an
ordinary tenant and the depletion of the estate caused by oil and
gas operations, however, a simple power to lease, not specifying
mineral exploitation as the object, is not construed to permit
leasing for that purpose.48 Often the problems of interpreting
wills or trust documents involve vexing uncertainty. 49  Conse-
quently, it must be a relief to all concerned if the land is located
within the borders of a state which has enacted one of those help-
ful statutes providing for the execution of leases by personal
representatives or trustees, acting under judicial sanction and
supervision.5"
Various governmental units may own land which is in the
area of active oil play. Whether, by whom, and in what way
such land is subject to lease is always a matter of statutory en-
actment and construction. The subject is too complex for detailed
consideration here. It is mentioned as a reminder of the need to
43 Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Freeman, 68 Kan. 691, 75 Pac. 995 (1904) (ex-
ecutor); Allar Co. v. Roeser, 217 S.W. 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) (ad-
ministrator); Smith v. Womack, 231 S.W. 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921)
(executor).
44 Ohio Oil Co. v. Daughetee, 240 Ill. 361, 88 N.E. 818, 36 L.R.A. (n.s.)
1108 (1909); Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Freeman, supra note 43.
45 First Nat'l Bank v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 144 Kan. 645, 62 P.2d 891
(1936).
46 Layman v. Hodnett, 205 Ark. 367, 168 S.W.2d 819 (1943); Heffelfinger
v. Scott, 142 Kan. 395, 47 P.2d 66 (1935); Hari v. Ewing, 314 Ky. 182,
234 S.W.2d 293 (1950); Franklin v. Margay Oil Corp., 194 Okla. 519,
153 P.2d 486 (1944). But cf. In re Bruner's Will, 363 Pa. 552, 70 A.2d
222, 18 A.L.R.2d 92 (1950).
47 Oliver v. Culpepper, 209 Ark. 326, 190 S.W.2d 457 (1945); Avis v. First
Nat'l Bank, 141 Tex. 489, 174 S.W.2d 255 (1943).
48 Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Freeman, 68 Kan. 691, 75 Pac. 995 (1904).
40 Note the construction in Robinson v. Barrett, 142 Kan. 68, 45 P.2d 587
(1935); Pedroja v. Pedroja, 152 Kan. 82, 102 P.2d 1012 (1940), in which
possibility of drainage and the existence of explosive oil booms, coupled
with a broad power to manage the trust estate, were held to justify
leasing for oil under permission from the district courts. See also
Shepherd, Execution of Mineral Leases by Trustees, 16 OKLA. B.A.J.
80 (1945).
50 As, for example, the statutes cited in note 41 supra.
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consult statutes and decisions and to proceed with caution in all
instances of doubt.5 '
B. DIVIDED OWNERSHIP
So much for the questions posed by single ownership of the
whole interest in the land to be leased. Ownership, however,
frequently is divided in various ways, and that division creates
more problems for the prospective lessor.
(1) Cotenancy
The rule that one cotenant may not commit waste upon the
commonly owned premises 52 has led a number of state courts to
rule that one cotenant may not, by himself or by his lessee, take
oil or gas.58 The only safe way to obtain a lease upon land held
in concurrent ownership in those states is to procure execution
by all the common proprietors.54 Moved by the need for prompti-
tude in the disposition of oil property 55 and by the problem of
protection against drainage, 56 most courts uphold the propriety
of a lease executed by one cotenant.57  Since one cotenant may
51 HOFFMAN, OIL AND GAS LEASING ON THE PUBLIc DOMAIN (1951); Mc-
LANE, OIL AND GAS LEASING ON INDIAN LANDS (1955), may be consulted
in connection with federally owned or managed lands. For Nebraska
lands, consult NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 57-218 to -221 (Reissue 1960); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 72-901 to -812 (Reissue 1960). Belgum v. City of Kim-
ball, 163 Neb. 774, 81 N.W.2d 205 (1957), involves the rights of a
municipality leasing its streets and alleys, holding that the city, as the
owner of a determinable fee therein, may lease them for the production
of oil and gas and receive the royalties therefrom. BROWN, OIL A
GAS LEASES § 2.12 (1958), contains a useful listing of cases on the
question of what municipal lands properly may be leased for oil and
gas purposes.
52 Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese, 195 La. 359, 196 So. 558 (1940);
Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S.E. 411, 38 L.R.A. 694 (1897).
53 Zeigler v. Brenneman, 237 Ill. 15, 86 N.E. 597 (1908); Gulf Ref. Co. v.
Carroll, 145 La. 299, 82 So. 277 (1919); Law v. Heck Oil Co., 106 W.
Va. 296, 145 S.E. 601 (1928) (injunction secured by owner of 1/768
interest against operations under lease in which all other owners
joined).
54 See West v. Continental Oil Co., 194 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1952). Subse-
quent ratification will do as well, of course. Sommers v. Bennett, 68
W. Va. 157, 69 S.E. 690 (1910). In Zeigler v. Brenneman, supra note 53,
the court indicated that if all the interests were leased, the individual
lessees could agree among themselves as to the conditions on which
operations should be carried on, thereby binding the lessee.
55 Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), affd,
108 Tex. 555, 195 S.W. 1139 (1917).
56 Dabney-Johnson Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal. 2d 637, 52 P.2d 237 (1935).
57 Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924);- Bates v.
Rogers, 178 Okla. 164, 62 P.2d 481 (1936).
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not exclude another,5 8 the operator developing under such a lease
must account to the non-leasing co-owners or to their lessees, 59
for their share of the production 0 less costs.8 1 There can be in-
convenience in such a situation.62 It is much better for the lessee
if he can get all the interests to join in the execution of the
lease.6 3 In some jurisdictions statutory procedures exist whereby
administrative 64 or judicial6 5 measures may be invoked to bring
together, under a single lease, land held in multiple co-ownership.
These provisions are held constitutional as a reasonable regulation
in aid of the proper adjustment of correlative interests.66
(2) Life Tenancy
Another form of divided ownership is presented by the ten-
ancy for life. As between the life tenant and the remainderman,
the former usually may not undertake to produce oil or gas from
5S Compton v. People's Gas Co., 75 Kan. 572, 89 Pac. 1039, 10 L.R.A. (n.s.)
787 (1907); Hochsprung v. Stevenson, 82 Mont. 222, 266 Pac. 406 (1928).
59 Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okla. 86, 27 P.2d 855, 91
A.L.R. 188 (1933).
60 Johnson v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 90 Kan. 565, 135 Pac. 589 (1913);
Ludey v. Pure Oil Co., 157 Okla. 1, 11 P.2d 102 (1931). However, in
case of ratification, only royalty may be recovered. Stephens v. Pres-
ton's Heirs, 300 Ky. 843, 190 S.W.2d 468 (1945).
61 Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924); York v.
Warren Oil & Gas Co., 191 Ky. 157, 229 S.W. 114 (1921); Marias River
Syndicate v. Big W. Oil Co., 98 Mont. 254, 38 P.2d 599 (1934); Naharkey
v. Sand Springs Home, 177 Okla. 371, 59 P.2d 289 (1936); Williamson
v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S.E. 411 (1897).
62 As between two lessees: Moody v. Wagner, 167 Okla. 99, 23 P.2d 633
(1933); as to accounting: Smith v. United Fuel Gas Co., 113 W. Va.
178, 166 S.E. 533 (1932); as to problems of development by one lessee
only and effect on obligations under other lease: Mattison v. Trotti,
262 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1959); Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.,
167 Okla. 86, 27 P.2d 855 (1933).
63 See BROWN, OIL AND GAS LEASES 5 (1958).
64 La. Acts 1952, No. 513, §§ 1-5. As a result of repeal of a portion of
this act in 1960, the procedure does not seem available for use in the
future, although administration under leases already made apparently
continues. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30.186-.188 (Supp. 1961).
65 ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 104, §§ 25-33 (Smith-Hurd 1957); Ky. REV. STAT.
§§ 353.300-.380 (1957); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.140(1)-(10) (1958);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 71-73 (1951).
66 Sun Oil Co. v. State Mineral Bd., 231 La. 689, 92 So. 2d 583 (1956),
appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 353 U.S.
962 (1957); cf. Superior Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 206 Okla.
213, 242 P.2d 454 (1952).
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the premises or execute a lease for such a purpose67 To this
there are exceptions, such as the power to lease or to execute
dispositive instruments if the land already has been devoted to
mineral production at the inception of the life estate; 68 express
authority arising out of the grant of a power of consumption to
the life tenant;6 9 the creation of the life estate without impeach-
ment of waste,7 0 or the existence of a threat of loss of the de-
posit through drainage.7 1 Similarly, the remainderman, acting
alone, may not grant by lease the authority to exploit the pe-
troliferous resources of the land,7 2 against the objections of the
67 Marlin v. Texas Co., 109 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1940); Eide v. Tveter, 143
F. Supp. 665 (D.N.D. 1956); Marshall v. Mellon, 179 Pa. 371, 36 Atl.
201, 35 L.R.A. 816 (1897); Swayne v. Lone Acre Oil Co., 98 Tex. 597,
86 S.W. 740, 69 L.R.A. 986 (1905); Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562,
27 S.E. 411, 38 L.R.A. 694 (1897). The remainderman may enjoin
operations under the lease: Ohio Oil Co. v. Daughetee, 240 Il1. 361, 88
N.E. 818, 36 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1108 (1909); Richmond Natural Gas Co. v.
Davenport, 37 Ind. App. 25, 76 N.E. 525 (1905); Russell v. Tipton, 193
Ky. 305, 235 S.W. 763 (1921). He may recover damages for the waste:
Rupel v. Ohio Oil Co., 176 Ind. 4, 95 N.E. 225 (1911). He may cancel
the lease as a cloud upon his title: Whitaker v. Surtees, 248 S.W. 432
(Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
68 The "open mine" theory, classically applicable when production exists
at the inception of the life estate, Mills v. Taylor, 268 S.W.2d 412 (Ky.
1954); Lawley v. Richardson, 101 Okla. 40, 223 Pac. 156, 43 A.L.R. 803
(1924), has been applied also to production later obtained under a
lease in existence at the beginning of the tenancy. Andrews v. An-
drews, 31 Ind. App. 189, 67 N.E. 461 (1903); Benson v. Nyman, 136
Kan. 455, 16 P.2d 963 (1932); Youngman v. Shular, 155 Tex. 437, 288
S.W.2d 495 (1956); Minner v. Minner, 84 W. Va. 679, 100 S.E. 509
(1919). It permits the life tenant to execute agreements for the in-
troduction of secondary recovery operations and to receive the royalty
therefrom. In re Shailer's Estate, 266 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1954), discussed
in 8 OKLA. L. Rnv. 367 (1955).
69 Guest v. Bizzell, 271 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). But cf. Woelk
v. Woelk, 174 Kan. 130, 254 P.2d 297 (1953).
70 See 2 TIFFANY, RIEAL PROPERTY § 639 (3d ed. 1939); 2 WILLi As & MEY-
FRs, Om. AND GAS LAW § 512.1 (1959). I have not been able to find
any cases applying this concept to oil and gas leasing.
71 Gerkins v. Kentucky Salt Co., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 34, 36 S.W. 1 (Ct. App.
1896). In effect this is sustained by the later decision in the same
case, 100 Ky. 734, 89 S.W. 444 (1897). But cf. Richmond Natural Gas
Co. v. Davenport, 37 Ind. App. 25, 76 N.E. 525 (1905). Despite the
dearth of authority, the principle seems sound.
72 Welborn v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 217 F.2d 509 (10th Cir. 1954),
discussed in 9 OKLA. L. REv. 83 (1956). But cf. Davis v. Atlantic Oil
Producing Co., 87 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1936), discussed in 16 TExAs L.
REv. 420 (1938).
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life tenant,73 so long as the latter lives.7 4  Acting in conjunction,
however, by the same instrument,7 5 or by separate instruments, 76
the life tenant and the remainderman may devote the land to
mineral development. These, of course, are the methods the pru-
dent investor will follow in taking leases.77 Ratification by one
of a lease executed by the other will have the same effect as
original joinder.7 8 There are vexing questions concerning the
apportionment of royalty, as to which the rule is unsettled 79 in
the absence of controlling statute.s0 Statutory provisions also may
be found authorizing procedures for the leasing of land where
life tenant and remainderman are unable to agree,8 ' or where
contingent interests are involved, precluding the possibility of
effective leasing.8 2
73 Carter Oil Co. v. McQuigg, 112 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1940); Brandenburg
v. Petroleum Exploration, 218 Ky. 557, 291 S.W. 757 (1927) (estoppel).
74 See Welborn v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 217 F.2d 509 (10 Cir.
1954).
75 Prout v. Hoy Oil Co., 263 Ill. 54, 105 N.E. 26 (1914); Meredith v. Mere-
dith, 193 Ky. 192, 235 S.W. 757 (1921); Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Wiede-
mann Oil Co., 211 Ky. 361, 277 S.W. 323 (1924); Barnes v. Keys, 36
Okla. 6, 127 Pac. 261, 45 L.R.A. 178 (n.s.) (1912); Blakely v. Marshall,
174 Pa. 425, 34 Atl. 564 (1896).
7- Orndoff v. Consumers' Fuel Co., 308 Pa. 165, 162 Atl. 431 (1932), dis-
cussed in 31 MICH. L. REV. 998 (1933). Query: as to the merger, by
assignment, of separate leases executed to different lessees by life ten-
ant and remainderman, see Rowe v. Bird, 304 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1957).
77 Blakely v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 428, 34 Atl. 564 (1896) ("[N]o prac-
tical oil operator would undertake the development of supposed oil
territory on the faith of a lease from life tenants only .... "). Note,
however, that one who takes separate leases may be bound to pay the
royalties under each lease cumulatively, so that he is liable for more
than the customary amount. Orndoff v. Consumers' Fuel Co., supra
note 76. But cf. Weekley v. Weekley, 126 W. Va. 90, 27 S.E.2d 591, 150
A.L.R. 689 (1943).
78 Mills v. Mills, 275 Ky. 431, 121 S.W.2d 962 (1938).
79 See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 512.2 (1959).
80 Most noteworthy of legislation in this field is the UNIFORM PRINCIPAL
AND INCOME ACT, 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 365 (1957), adopted in
twenty-three states, but not in Nebraska.
81 Examples are afforded by ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-302 to -311 (1947),
and W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3542-54 (1955). The constitutionality of these
statutes has been upheld, as against objections stemming from the
claims of contingent remaindermen. See Love v. McDonald, 201 Ark.
882, 148 S.W.2d 170 (1941); Geary v. Butts, 84 W. Va. 348, 99 S.E. 492
(1919). However, the principles applied in Sun Oil Co. v. State Min-
eral Bd., 231 La. 689, 92 So. 2d 583 (1956), sustain their general validity
as to all interests.
82 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 57-222 to -224 (Reissue 1960). As to procedure
under such statutes, see Ellis v. Rudy, 253 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1952).
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(3) Interest in Minerals Only
Divided interests may take the form of a separation of the
surface from ownership of part or all of the subsurface. There
may be outright ownership of all or of a fraction of the mineral
interests. In the case of the solid minerals this will involve title
to the substances themselves, in place. 3 Due to the varied
theories concerning the extent and nature of property rights to
oil and gas in their natural condition,8 4 it is more satisfactory to
speak, in respect to them, of a title to the mineral interests, 5
meaning thereby succession to the legal authority ordinarily in-
hering in the owner of the surface to prospect for these sub-
stances and, if they are found, to reduce them to possession and
to dispose of them.8 6 The holder of such a mineral interest, in-
cidental thereto, has full power to execute a lease covering it.87
Of course, if he does not own the entire mineral interest in the
tract, his position will be that of an owner in common, and the
effect of his lease will be governed by principles already dis-
cussed with reference to common ownership s s
The mineral interest itself may be divided into an assortment
of more limited interests: the right to explore and develop; the
right to execute leases or other instruments affecting the min-
eral interest; and the right to receive "bonus" payments for ex-
ecuting a lease, "delay rental" payments or "shut-in" payments
for the privilege of delayed drilling or delayed marketing, and
"royalty" payments based on production from the premises.8 9
These interests individually may be the subject of bargain and of
transfer.90  The "executive right"91 of leasing may be combined
83 Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. 475, 72 Am. Dec. 760 (1858); Feather v.
Baird, 85 W. Va. 267, 102 S.E. 294 (1919).
84 See 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 203-04 (1959), for a
discussion of various theories.
85 Id. § 202.2.
86 See MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES 15 (2d ed.
1940).
87 McCall v. Nettles, 251 Ala. 349, 37 So. 2d 635 (1948).
88 Amundson v. Gordon, 134 Mont. 142, 328 P.2d 630 (1958).
89 See I WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 301; Morris, Some Legal
Consequences Resulting from a Separation of the Incidents of Owner-
ship of a Mineral Interest, 7 ORLA. L. REV. 285, 287 (1954).
90 See MERRILL, THE PUBLIc's CONCERN WITH THE FUEL MINERALS 75-76
(1960), for a listing of various forms of divided property interests re-
ceiving judicial recognition.
91 For judicial use of this term see Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, 249 S.W.2d
269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). The executive right holder is subject to
special duties of fairness and good faith in favor of other interest-
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with any or all of these other interests. Whoever possesses that
right is the person with whom the prospective lessee may deal.
It seems sensible that ownership of the executive right could be
isolated from any of the other rights.92  On the theory that the
right is in essence nothing more than a power to deal with the
property of others, such an isolation has been held to violate the
Rule Against Perpetuities in California.93 Other jurisdictions
adopting the better view, that it is a species of property right in
itself,94 have upheld the propriety of such a grant, expressly98 or
impliedly.9 6.
Ordinarily a grant of "royalty" as distinguished from a grant
of "minerals," of "mineral interest," or of specifically named sub-
stances does not carry with it the executive right.97
In the drafting of instruments covering the separation of oil
and gas interests, much depends upon choice of language as to the
character and amount of the interest. The necessary limitations
upon the scope of this discussion preclude anything more than
a reference to the problem and to useful discussion thereof.9s
The existence of a mortgage upon the premises on which a
lease is sought renders the owner unable to give a lease which
will bind the security interest.9 This is important, not only be-
cause foreclosure may cut off the lessee's rights,100 but also be-
cause structures placed on the land by the lessee, which cannot
be removed without injury to the premises, inure to the benefit
of the security holder. 101
III. DURATION OF LEASE
A. HABENDUM CLAUSE
Various clauses affect the duration of the lease. Primarily,
holders. See MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES §
191C (Supp. 1959).
9.2 Cf. Rudes v. Field, 146 Tex. 133, 204 S.W.2d 5 (1947).
9-3 Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. 2d 541, 114 P.2d 646 (3d. Dist. 1941).
94 See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 338 (1959).
95 Hanson v. Ware, 224 Ark. 430, 274 S.W.2d 359 (1955).
96 See cases collected in 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 21-23
(1959).
97 Davis v. Mann, 234 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1956).
98 See 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 302-07, 320 (1959);
Bowen, Pitfalls in Mineral Conveyancing in Oklahoma, 9 OKLA. L. REV.
133 (1956).
99 Ball v. Coyle, 108 Okla. 30, 233 Pac. 750 (1925).
100 Yarg Producing & Ref. Corp. v. Iles Inv. Co., 88 Colo. 412, 297 Pac. 1001
(1931); Breeding v. Ritterhoff, 126 Okla. 225, 259 Pac. 227 (1927).
101 Smith v. Bush, 173 Okla. 172, 44 P.2d 921, 101 A.L.R. 330 (1935).
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there is the so-called habendum clause-the term derives from
the traditional pattern of common law conveyancing' 0 2-which,
in modern form, specifies a duration for a fixed number'0 3 of
years, generally referred to as the "primary term," the "fixed
term"'0 4 or the "exploratory period,"'10 5 and "so long thereafter
as oil or gas are produced from said land" or "are produced in
paying quantities."'' 00
B. DELAY RENTAL CLAUSE
Another clause which may affect the duration of the lease
is the so-called delay rental provision107 While the habendum
clause, standing alone, appears to give the lessee the entire length
of the primary term in which to extend the life of the lease by
achieving production, the courts at a comparatively early date
gave effect to the lessor's understandable desire for prompt ac-
tion by raising the implied covenant for diligent exploration of
the premises within a reasonable time.10
(1) "Or" Lease
For the purpose of relieving the lessee from the obligations
of this requirement, while giving the lessor something by way of
compensation for his wait, a clause was devised whereby the
lessee agreed to commence a well before a specified day (usually
one year from the execution date) or to pay a fixed sum to the
lessor, with provision for further periodic payments in place of
drilling and forfeiture upon default of performance. 0 9  The
lessees unquestionably felt that they achieved thereby an op-
tion to drill or to pay the "delay rental," or, if they desired to
drop the whole venture, to terminate the affair simply by fail-
102 The clause, in a typical lease of the traditional form, reads: "To have
and to hold unto said lessee and to lessee's successors and assigns for
the term of seven (7) years from the date hereof and as much longer
thereafter as oil or gas are produced from said land."
103 See WILLmAs & MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TEuvs 189 (1957).
104 See KULP, OIL AND GAS RIGHTs § 10.30 (1954).
105 See WILLAlVS & AIEYEas, op. cit. supra note 103, at 90.
106 A sampling of diverse phrasings of the habendum clause is contained
in BROWN, OIL AND GAS LEASES § 5.11 (1958).
107 See WILLIAMs & MVEYEs, op. cit. supra note 103, at 56.
108 See MEnMLL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES §§ 50, 51 (2d
ed. 1940).
109 See KULp, OIL AND GAS RIGHTS 597 (1954).
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ing either to drill or to pay. Much to their disappointment, the
courts ruled that the option simply was to drill or to pay delay
rental throughout the primary term.110 The forfeiture provision
was for the lessor's benefit only. Even when a clause giving the
lessee the option to surrender the lease at any time was intro-
duced, the operator who absent-mindedly neglected to execute
the release found himself stuck with liability for all rentals ac-
cruing prior to the time of exercising the option."' Also, some
judges came to the conclusion that the presence of the option
made the obligations lacking in mutuality so that the lease be-
came unenforcible against the lessor." 2
(2) "Unless" Lease
Accordingly the provision was rephrased to make the lease
terminate automatically if no well was commenced within the
specified time, unless the lessee paid delay rental.' 3  This "un-
110 Woodland Oil Co. v. Crawford, 55 Ohio St. 161, 44 N.E. 1093 (1896);
Wills v. Manufacturers' Natural Gas Co., 130 Pa. 222, 18 Atl. 721 (1889);
Roberts v. Bettman, 45 W. Va. 143, 30 S.E. 95 (1898). Cf. Jackson v.
Twin State Oil Co., 95 Okla. 96, 218 Pac. 324 (1923); Thompson v.
Christie, 138 Pa. 230, 20 Atl. 934, 11 L.R.A. 236 (1890), holding that
under a drill or pay lease without a forfeiture clause, neither party
could claim termination.
111 Davis v. Olympic Ref. Co., 46 Cal. App. 2d 799, 117 P.2d 9 (2d Dist.
1941); Healdton Oil & Gas Co. v. Smith, 80 Okla. 242, 195 Pac. 756
(1921).
112 Brown v. Wilson, 58 Okla. 392, 160 Pac. 94 (1916); Steelsmith v. Gart-
lan, 45 W. Va. 27, 29 S.E. 978 (1898).
113 A typical "unless" clause reads as follows: "If operations for the
drilling of a well for oil or gas are not commenced on said land on or
before one year from this date, this lease shall terminate as to both
parties, unless the lessee shall, on or before one year from this date,
pay or tender to the lessor or for the lessor's credit in the ...................
Bank at --------... ---- , or its successors, which bank and its successors
are the lessor's agent and shall continue as the depository of any and
all sums payable under this lease, regardless of changes of ownership
in said land or in the oil and gas, or in the rentals to accrue there-
under, the sum of --------.------ Dollars ($ ----------- ) which shall operate as
rental and cover the privilege of deferring the commencement of drill-
ing operations for a period of one year. In like manner and upon like
payments or tenders, the commencement of drilling operations may be
further deferred for like periods successively. All payments or tenders
may be made by check or draft of lessee or any assignee thereof,
mailed or delivered on or before the rental paying date. Notwith-
standing the death of the lessor, or his successor in interest, the pay-
ment or tender of rentals in the manner provided above shall be bind-
ing on the heirs, devisees, executors, and administrators of such per-
son."
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less" form has proved so much more satisfactory to both lessors
and lessees than the "or" form that the latter today is rarely en-
countered.1 14
Under the "unless" form, then, the lease terminates before
expiration of the primary term, if the lessee neither commences
operations nor pays the delay rental by the specified date.115 The
termination is absolute, so that the lessor may not recover delay
rental.1 6 Also, in most jurisdictions, time is of the essence,1 1 7 so
that the lessee may not receive relief for default in payment
arising from inadvertence," 8 misfeasance of transmission, 1 9 mis-
take as to persons 1 20 or amount 12 ' and like causes.1 22  Occasion-
ally, if the lessor has contributed to the error,1 23 or if other
114 See BROWN, OIL AND GAS LEASES 126 (1958).
115 Eitel v. Alford, 127 Colo. 341, 257 P.2d 955 (1953); Morton v. Sutcliffe,
175 Kan. 699, 266 P.2d 734, 5 A.L.R.2d 993 (1954); Schumacher v. Cole,
131 Mont. 166, 309 P.2d 311 (1957); Valentine Oil Co. v. Powers, 157
Neb. 71, 59 N.W.2d 150 (1953); Ellison v. Skelly Oil Co., 206 Okla. 496,
244 P.2d 832 (1952).
116 Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Empire Oil & Ref. Co., 148 Kan. 813, 84
P.2d 911 (1938); Deming Inv. Co. v. Lanham, 36 Okla. 773, 130 Pac.
260, 44 L.R.A. (n.s.) 50 (1913).
117 Epperson v. Helbron, 145 Ark. 566, 225 S.W. 345, 15 A.L.R. 597 (1920);
Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Indian-Tex Petroleum Co., 202 Ky. 236, 259
S.W. 57 (1924); McDaniel v. Hager-Stevenson Oil Co., 75 Mont. 356,
243 Pac. 582 (1926).
118 Hill v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 119 Colo. 477, 205 P.2d 643 (1949);
Johnson v. Smallenberger, 237 La. 11, 110 So. 2d 119 (1959); Woodside
v. Lee, 81 N.W.2d 745 (N.D. 1957).
119 Abell v. Bishop, 86 Mont. 478, 284 Pac. 525 (1930). But cf. Oldfield v.
Gypsy Oil Co., 123 Okla. 293, 253 Pac. 298 (1926) (postal misdelivery
excused). In some instances, the lease is construed as merely requir-
ing mailing of the rental to the lessee, rather than delivery or deposit
to his credit. Baker v. Potter, 223 La. 274, 65 So. 2d 598 (1953); Hitz
v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 43 Ohio App. 484, 183 N.E. 768 (1932).
120 LeRosen v. North Cent. Texas Oil Co., 169 La. 973, 126 So. 442 (1930);
New England Oil & Pipe Line Co. v. Rogers, 154 Okla. 285, 7 P.2d 638(1931).
121 Young v. Jones, 222 S.W. 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
122 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Curtis, 182 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1950) (mistake
as to lease being held by production); Vaughan v. Doss, 219 Ark. 963,
245 S.W.2d 826 (1952) (wrong bank); Warner v. Page, 59 Okla. 259,
159 Pac. 264 (1916) (unsigned check); Garfield Oil Co. v. Champlin,
78 Okla. 91, 189 Pac. 514 (1920) (time); Ireland v. Chatman, 87 Okla.
223, 209 Pac. 408 (1922) (banker's failure to make deposit); Humble
Oil & Ref. Co. v. Mullican, 144 Tex. 609, 192 S.W.2d 770 (1946) (time).
123 Saling v. Flesch, 85 Mont. 106, 277 Pac. 612 (1929) (delay in present-
ing check); Superior Oil Co. v. Jackson, 207 Okla. 437, 250 P.2d 23(1952) (uncertainty as to apportionment of lessor interest). But cf.
Stady v. Texas Co., 150 Kan. 420, 94 P.2d 322 (1939) (denial of relief,
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equitable considerations are present,12 4 relief is granted.
Other difficult problems arise where the commencement of
drilling is relied upon to absolve the payment of delay rental as
a means of continuing the lease in effect. What constitutes com-
mencement?125 If the well is commenced, it is agreed that drill-
ing must be pursued with due diligence. 26 But, again, what is
due diligence? 27
C. DRILLING A DRY HOLE
If the lessee undertakes to hold the lease by sinking a well
and it turns out to be dry, vexing questions again arise. Some
courts hold that the drilling of the one well absolves the lessee
from further action. 28  The weight of authority, however, bring
the implied covenant for development into play, 29 in analogy
to the rule regarding exploration. 3 0 To avoid the necessity of
suggesting lessee should procure appointment of receiver to take delay
rental, pending determination of persons entitled).
124 Brunson v. Carter Oil Co., 263 Fed. 935 (E.D. Okla. 1919) (change in
ownership, bookkeeper's error); Kays v. Little, 103 Kan. 461, 175 Pac.
149, 1 A.L.R. 675 (1918) (failure of mail service); Browning v. Weaver,
158 Kan. 255, 146 P.2d 390, 5 A.L.R.2d 985 (1944) (lessor's attempt to
carry water on both shoulders, awaiting outcome of test well).
125 Cases are collected in 2 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 349 (perm. ed. 1958);
KuLP, OIL AND GAS RIGHTS § 10.34 (1954); BROWN, OIL AND GAS LEASES
§ 7.04 (1958).
120 See MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § 44 (2d ed.
1940).
127 Geier-Jackson, Inc. v. James, 160 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Tex. 1958) (indili-
gence); Hughes v. Ford, 406 Ill. 171, 92 N.E.2d 747 (1950) (indiligence);
Illinois Mid-Continent Co. v. Tennis, 122 Ind. App. 17, 102 N.E.2d 390
(1951) (indiligence); Wright v. Hunt, 190 Ky. 683, 228 S.W. 27 (1921)
(fact question); Robinson v. Gordon Oil Co., 258 Mich. 643, 242 N.W.
795 (1932) (diligence); Keechi Oil & Gas Co. v. Smith, 81 Okla. 266, 198
Pac. 588 (1921) (diligence); Karns v. Tanner, 66 Pa. 297 (1870) (fact
question-doubtful decision); Munroe v. Armstrong, 96 Pa. 307 (1880)
(indiligence); Bartley v. Phillips, 165 Pa. 325, 30 Atl. 842 (1895) (fact
question); Cockrum v. Christy, 223 S.W. 308 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920)
(diligence); Woods v. Bost, 26 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (fact
question).
128 Nabors v. Producers' Oil Co., 140 La. 985, 74 So. 527 (1917); Smith v.
Tullos, 195 La. 400, 196 So. 912 (1940).
129 Hill v. Larcon Co., 131 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Ark. 1955); Ohio Oil Co. v.
Detamore, 165 Ind. 243, 73 N.E. 906 (1905); Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co.,
95 Mont. 434, 28 P.2d 187 (1933); Steelsmith v. Gartlan, 45 W. Va. 27,
29 S.E. 978 (1898).
130 See MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § 54 (2d ed.
1940).
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continuous activity, there have been introduced clauses such as
the following:
If at any time prior to the discovery of oil or gas on
this land and during the term of this lease, the lessee
shall drill a dry hole, or holes, on this land, this lease shall
not terminate, provided operations for the drilling of a
well shall be commenced within twelve months from the
expiration of the last rental period for which rental has
been paid, or provided that within said period the lessee
begins or resumes the payment of rentals in the manner
and amount herein above provided; and in this event
the preceding paragraphs hereof governing the payment
of rentals and the manner and effect therof shall con-
tinue in force.
These clauses, granting the privilege to resume delay rental
payments in lieu of drilling, thereby excluding implied duties
to continue drilling,13' are construed strictly against the lessee
both as to the occasion for exercise 3 2 and as to the date of pay-
ment.133 On the other hand, so long as the conditions alternative
to the need for resumption exist, there is no need to pay delay
rental. 13 4
D. AmouNT OF RENTAL
Traditionally, through most of the oil country, the rate of
delay rental has been one dollar per acre per year. In complete-
ly wildcat areas, the oil men have been able to bring this sum
down materially. During the Great Depression there was a move-
ment by lessees to secure a lower sum, sometimes by a threat to
drop existing leases. This vanished as the crisis lightened. With
the depreciation of the dollar over the last twenty years, it may
be that the traditional rate no longer can be sustained. Certainly
it does not aid the lessor in paying his taxes and other land
charges as much as it did in the days when the tradition as to
'31 Cf. Miles v. Ashby, 295 Ky. 500, 174 S.W.2d 753 (1943).
132 Niles v. Luttrell, 61 F. Supp. 778 (W.D. Ky. 1945) (inordinate delay
in completing dry test); Freeland v. Edwards, 11 fI. 2d 395, 142 N.E.2d
701 (1957) (resumption clause cannot be used to extend lease beyond
primary term).
133 Sittig v. Dalton, 195 La. 765, 197 So. 423 (1940).
'34 Wilson v. Wakefield, 146 Kan. 693, 72 P.2d 978 (1937) (dry hole ab-
solves delay rental for year); Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 166
Neb. 410, 89 N.W.2d 245 (1958) (resumption not due so long as produc-
tion in any quantity continued).
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the amount of delay rental originated. 135 Lawyers advising pros-
pective lessors may be justified in suggesting to their clients that
they hold out for a more remunerative delay rental provision.
E. PRODUCTION REQUIREMNTS
Reverting to the habendum clause, we have seen that, after
the conclusion of the primary term,136 the continued duration of
the lease is made to depend upon production, 137 or upon produc-
tion in paying quantities.3 8 The general rule is that this requires
that actual production be accomplished, 139 rather than commenc-
ing work upon a well, 140 even though accompanied by some
reasonable showing of probable success justified by later achieve-
ment.141 In a few instances, a result more favorable to the
lessee has been justified upon the inclusion in the habendum
clause of the phrase "if oil or gas is discovered" or an equivalent
wording.142  In still other cases, the courts, without benefit of
such phrasing, have held that the discovery of an apparently
profitable sand within the primary term gives the lessee a rea-
sonable time to exercise diligence in the work of testing and
completion, even though this extends beyond the fixed term. 143
Obviously, this requires the taking of substantial liberties with
the language employed in the document. 144
If the well is under way, merely, at the close of the explora-
tory term, the language commonly employed seems to dictate the
135 As of the first quarter of the present century, the dollar an acre pay-
ment would be a substantial contribution to the annual tax bill on the
ordinary farm, if, indeed, it did not exceed that exaction.
136 Kinne v. Swanson Consol. Oil Co., 293 Mich. 509, 292 N.W. 472 (1940);
Humphreys v. Fletcher, 27 N.M. 639, 204 Pac. 70 (1922); Brown v.
Fowler, 65 Ohio St. 507, 63 N.E. 76 (1902).
137 Sawyer v. Potter, 223 Ky. 359, 3 S.W.2d 758 (1928); South Penn Oil
Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S.E. 961, 43 L.R.A. (n.s.) 848 (1913).
138 Moon v. Marker, 26 Cal. App. 2d 33, 78 P.2d 460 (3d Dist. 1938);
Hanna v. Shorts, 163 Ohio St. 44, 125 N.E.2d 338 (1955).
139 Baldwin v. Blue Stem Oil Co., 106 Kan. 848, 189 Pac. 920 (1920); Town
of Tome Land Grant v. Ringle Dev. Co., 56 N.M. 101, 240 P.2d 850
(1952); Dygus v. Rogers, 198 Okla. 632, 181 P.2d 253 (1947).
140 Perkins v. Saunders, 109 Kan. 372, 198 Pac. 954 (1921).
141 Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
142 Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Bratton, 239 S.W. 688 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921); Bouldin v. Gulf Prod. Co., 5 S.W.2d 1019 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
Cf. Roach v. Junction Oil & Gas Co., 72 Okla. 213, 179 Pac. 934 (1919).
143 Bain v. Portable Drilling Co., 200 Okla. 569, 198 P.2d 207 (1948); South
Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S.E. 961 (1913).
144 See 2 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS 242 (perm. ed. 1958).
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conclusion that the lessee's rights have expired.14 In some juris-
dictions, a line is drawn based on the delay rental provision,
however, theorizing that the last delay rental payment secures
to the lessee the privilege of deferring the commencement of
the well clear up to the end of the primary term. To make this
privilege effective, it is considered necessary that the lessee be
permitted a reasonable time to complete the well and place it
in operation, even if this carries substantially past the fixed
term.146  Here, again, it must be said that substantial violence is
done to the plain language of the lease, which is intended to de-
fine the limits of the fixed term.1 47  The weight of authority,
numerical as well as meritorious, clearly is the other way.148
The same problem arises when production has been achieved
during the primary term, but thereafter trouble arises. Here
there is considerable justification for the view that a temporary
interruption of production does not terminate the lease, if the
lessee strives diligently to restore fruitfulness, either by rework-
ing the failing wells,149 or by drilling anew. 150 The better view
is against extending this period over too long a period of time.'6 '
Some decisions stretch it pretty far.15 2 Others apply strictly the
145 Cooke v. Gulf Ref. Co., 127 La. 592, 53 So. 874 (1910); Morrison v.
Swaim, 220 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
146 Simpson v. Buckner's Adm'r., 247 Ky. 564, 57 S.W.2d 464 (1933); Sim-
ons v. McDaniel, 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d 419 (1932).
147 2 SmmnVFs, Oi. AND GAS 202 (perm. ed. 1958).
148 Perkins v. Saunders, 109 Kan. 372, 198 Pac. 954 (1921); Murdock-West
Co. v. Logan, 69 Ohio St. 514, 69 N.E. 984 (1904); Heard v. Nichols, 293
S.W. 805 (Tex. Com. App. 1927).
149 Reynolds v. McNeill, 218 Ark. 453, 236 S.W.2d 723 (1951); Brown v.
Shafer, 325 P.2d 743 (Okla. 1958) (dictum).
150 Cotner v. Warren, 330 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1958), discussed in 35 N. DAM
L. REV. 234 (1959).
151 Anthis v. Sullivan Oil & Gas Co., 83 Okla. 86, 203 Pac. 187 (1922);
Townsend v. Creekmore-Rooney Co., 332 P.2d 35 (Okla. 1958).
152 Saulsberry v. Siegel, 221 Ark. 152, 252 S.W.2d 834 (1952). Cf. Frost
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 238 Miss. 775, 119 So. 2d 759 (1960), in -which, after
favorable showings at various levels, a well finally was completed as
an oil producer in 1945. The primary term expired in 1947. The oil
sand ceased to produce in 1955. About a month later, the lessee com-
pleted the well as a gas producer in one of the by-passed sands. It
was held that the lease continued in effect. This is all very well, so
far as diligence in achieving production after the failure of the first
sand is concerned, but there is at least a serious question as to whether
the lessee was not unduly dilatory in waiting so long to test the prod-
uctivity of the second stratum, which was known to exist when the
well first was completed.
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rule that the lease terminates with the failure of production. 153
We have seen that the leases vary in defining the event which
continues the lease in being, sometimes phrasing it as "produc-
tion" and sometimes as "production in paying quantities." While
a few decisions seem to regard the phraseology as significant,
holding that the former is satisfied so long as the lessee extracts
the least amount of product, 5 4 the great weight of authority con-
siders that "paying quantities" is to be read into those clauses
that do not spell it out.155 The test of production in paying
quantities is whether, over a substantial period of time, not just
a few weeks or months, 15 current revenue from the operation
of the lease exceeds current expense. 1 5 7 Sales may not necessari-
ly reflect the entire production, however, and to this extent al-
lowance should be made for the actual value of the product and
deductions should be made if the sales include production from
too distant a date. 5 8 Depreciation charges on investment are not
to be considered as an expense in this sense. 159 Overriding royal-
ties or other charges on the working interest are not to be de-
ducted from income.160
Increasingly, leases include provisions intended to ameliorate
the effect of the standard habendum clause. One common pro-
vision specifically allows the completion of a test well under way
at the close of the primary term, or of any extension thereof,'0 '
with the effect of continuing the lease indefinitely if the well
is a producer. 62  However, this period for completion may not
153 Haby v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 228 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1955); Warner
v. Kulp, 114 Kan. 118, 217 Pac. 288 (1923); Cassell v. Crothers, 193 Pa.
359, 44 Atl. 446 (1899); Rogers v. Osborn, 152 Tex. 540, 261 S.W.2d 311
(1953); Anderson v. Schaffner, 90 W. Va. 225, 110 S.E. 566 (1922).
154 Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., 260 Ill. 169, 102 N.E. 1043 (1913).
155 McLeon v. Wells, 207 Ark. 303, 180 S.W.2d 325 (1944); Caldwell v.
Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139, 108 So. 314 (1926); Long v. Magnolia Petro-
leum Co., 166 Neb. 410, 89 N.W.2d 245 (1958); Brown v. Shafer, 325
P.2d 743 (Okla. 1958).
156 Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., 84 Cal. App. 2d 616, 191 P.2d 129
(2d Dist. 1948); Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
157 Dinwiddie v. Mulligan, 208 Ky. 320, 270 S.W. 774 (1925); Long v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 166 Neb. 410, 89 N.W.2d 245 (1958); Brown
v. Shafer, 325 P.2d 743 (Okla. 1958); Barbour, Stedman & Co. v. Tomp-
kins, 81 W. Va. 116, 93 S.E. 1038 (1917).
158 Sullivan & Garnett v. James, 308 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
159 Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
100 Vance v. Hurley, 215 La. 805, 41 So. 2d 724 (1949) (oil payment);
Clifton v. Koontz, supra note 159 (overriding royalty).
161 Humphreys v. Skelly Oil Co., 83 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1936).
162 Haddock v. McClendon, 223 Ark. 396, 266 S.W.2d 74 (1954).
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itself be regarded as an extension, allowing the lessee to con-
tinue his status by starting another well before writing off of
the test well as a dry hole.16 3
Another device is to provide that the lease shall not termi-
nate for want of production if the lessee commences additional
drilling or reworking operations within a specified time.6 4  On
failure to comply with the granted option, however, the lease
comes to an end.165 One form of operation cannot be tacked
onto another, however, so as to extend the fixed term indefinitely
in this way.16 6 In determining whether the privilege of drilling
163 Skelly Oil Co. v. Wickham, 202 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1953); Moore Oil
Co. v. Snakard, 150 F. Supp. 250 (W.D. Okla. 1957).
164 St Louis Royalty Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 193 F.2d 778 (5th Cir.
1952).
165 Haby v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 228 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1955); Brown-
ing v. Cavanaugh, 300 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1957); Seiber v. Ringgold, 231
La. 983, 93 So. 2d 530 (1957).
166 Rogers v. Osborn, 152 Tex. 540, 261 S.W.2d 311 (1953). But cf. Stano-
lind Oil & Gas Co. v. Newman Drilling Co., 157 Tex. 489, 305 S.W.2d
169 (1957) and criticism thereof in 56 MIcH. L. REv. 823 (1958). A
lease form evidently designed to permit "tacking" reads: "If a dry
hole is completed on leased premises or if all wells thereon cease to
be capable of producing oil, gas or substance covered hereby within
less than ninety (90) days before the end of the primary term, this
lease, if not otherwise kept in force, shall continue in force and effect
for a period of ninety (90) days from and after the date of the com-
pletion of such dry hole or the date when such wells ceased to be
capable of so producing, and if at the end of the primary term, or at
the expiration of said ninety (90) day period, oil, gas or substance
covered hereby is not being produced on said leased premises, but Les-
see is then engaged in operations for drilling, reworking or produc-
ing, this lease shall continue in force so long as any operations for
drilling, reworking or producing (including operations for additional
drilling or reworking commenced during such continuance) are prose-
cuted with no cessation of more than ninety (90) days, and f such
operations result in the production of oil, gas or substance covered
hereby, then so long thereafter as oil, gas or any of them, or any sub-
stance covered hereby, is produced from said land.
' Without limiting any provision of this lease, it is expressly agreed
that if, during the primary term of this lease or at any time thereafter
that this lease is in force, the Lessee shall commence operations for
drilling or reworking on leased premises, this lease shall continue in
full force and effect and its term shall continue as long as such opera-
tions for drilling or reworking (including operations for additional
drilling or reworking commenced during such continuance) are prose-
cuted with no cessation of more than ninety (90) days, and if any
such operations for drilling or reworking result in the production of
oil, gas or substance covered hereby, then this lease shall be continued
so long thereafter as oil or gas, casinghead gas or oil-well gas or liquid
hydrocarbons or gaseous hydrocarbons or any substance covered here-
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has been carried on with proper diligence, a reasonable time for
testing the prospective production is allowed.167
F. EFFECT OF ADVERSE MARKET CONDITIONS
Adverse market conditions sometime prevent production.
Some courts hold that this warrants extension of the lease, so
long as the lessee is diligent in his attempts to secure a market.1 68
The situation seems to arise typically with respect to gas.169
Many leases specifically deal with this situation by allowing the
payment of so-called shut-in royalty as a substitute for produc-
tion and the payment of ordinary royalty, as a means of continu-
ing the lease in effect. 7 0 These provisions are effectual,' 7 ' but
by, or any of them, is produced from said land, or operations for drill-
ing or reworking are continued as herein provided."
It has not yet received judicial interpretation.
167 Fields v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 233 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1956).
168 Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 Kan. 351, 240 P.2d 465 (1952);
McVicker v. Horn, Robinson & Nathan, 322 P.2d 410 (Okla. 1958).
169 See 2 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS 220 (perm. ed. 1958).
170 A somewhat wordy clause of this kind reads: "at any time, either
before or after the expiration of the primary term of this lease, if
there is a gas well or wells on the above land (and for the purposes
of this clause (c) the term 'gas well' shall include wells capable of
producing natural gas, condensate, distillate or any gaseous substance
and wells classified as gas wells by any governmental authority) and
such well or wells are shut in before or after production therefrom,
lessee or any assignee hereunder may pay or tender an .advance annual
royalty equal to the amount of delay rentals provided for in this lease
for the acreage then held under this lease by the party making such
payment or tender, and if such payment or tender is made, it shall be
considered under all provisions of this lease that gas is being produced
from the leased premises in paying quantities for one (1) year from
the date such payment or tender is made, and in like manner subse-
quent advance annual royalty payments may be made or tendered and
it will be considered under all provisions of this lease that gas is being
produced from the leased premises in paying quantities during any
annual period for which such royalty is paid or tendered; such ad-
vance royalty may be paid or tendered in the same manner as pro-
vided herein for the payment or tender of delay rentals; royalty ac-
cruing to the owners thereof on any production from the leased prem-
ises during any annual period for which advance royalty is paid may
be credited against such advance payment; and when there is a shut-
in gas well or wells on the leased premises if this lease is not contin-
ued in force under some other provision thereof, it shall nevertheless
continue in force for a period of ninety (90) days from the last date
on which a gas well located on the leased premises is shut in, or for
ninety (90) days following the date to which this lease is continued in
force by some other provision thereof, as the case may be, within
which ninety day period lessee or any assignee hereunder may com-
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the lessee must take care to pay the shut-in royalty on time17 2
and before the expiration of the fixed term.17 3  It has been ar-
gued persuasively that, if the well is not completed until after
that date, prompt payment upon completion should suffice.17 4
Otherwise there would seem little effectiveness to the extended
drilling privilege in such circumstances. Under the shut-in clauses,
as commonly drafted,175 so much ambiguity arises as to just
when the payment should be made that the interests of both the
lessor and the lessee render desirable more specific delineation
in respect to this problem. 7 6
Lawyers representing prospective lessors may well counsel
with their clients concerning the amount to be paid as shut-in
royalty. Frequently this is placed at the same amount as the de-
lay rental, one dollar, or less, per acre per year. 77 The logic of
mence or resume the payment or tender of the advance royalty as
herein provided."
'71 Morriss v. First Nat'l Bank, 249 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
172 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid, 337 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1960).
173 Lamczyk v. Allen, 8 Ill. 2d 547, 134 N.E.2d 753 (1956); Freeman v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 141 Tex. 274, 171 S.W.2d 339 (1943).
174 See Huie, Some Recent Developments in the Law of Oil and Gas, 1960
A.B.A. PROCEEDINGS, SECTION OF MINERAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
148, 158, criticizing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid, 337 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1960).
175 See Moses, Recent Problems in Connection with Shut-in Royalty Pro-
visions in Oil and Gas Leases, 10 LOYOLA L. REV. 1 (1960); Masterson,
The Shut-in Royalty Clause in an Oil and Gas Lease, 12 Sw. L.J. 459
(1958).
176 One essay at such a clause reads: "The term 'stated date' as used in
this paragraph shall mean any rental paying date of this lease or any
subsequent anniversary thereof if there be a rental paying date, but if
no rental paying date is specified in this lease, then 'stated date' shall
mean any anniversary date of this lease. If on any such stated date
there be on the above described lands or on lands with which the
above described lands or portion thereof are pooled or unitized, one
or more such gas wells capable of producing gas only, and no gas has
been sold or so used from any of such gas wells at any time during
the twelve months period ending with such stated date, Lessee shall,
before the expiration of sixty (60) days after such stated date, pay or
tender to each owner of the right to receive royalty on the gas prod-
uced from any part of the above described lands covered by this lease
on such stated date at each such owner's address as last known to Les-
see, or to the credit of each such owner in the depository bank named
herein, in the manner provided herein for payment of delay rentals, a
shut-in gas royalty for such period."
177 For example, see the following: "The total amount of shut-in gas
royalty payable to all such owners shall be determined by multiplying
One Dollar ($1.00) by the total number of acres of land covered by
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the situation seems to call for a shut-in payment substantially
higher than delay rentals. The latter payment is made simply to
continue the lease in being as a speculative option on the part of
the lessee. On the other hand, the shut-in royalty comes into ef-
fect only when it has been demonstrated that the leased premises
are valuably productive. They constitute a partial substitute for
the return which the lessor would get from actual production and
a payment by the lessee for the privilege of preserving his ec-
onomically advantageous interest in a proven area. This he does
by destruction of the lessor's opportunity to realize upon the es-
tablished productive capacity of his land. At the same time, the
well and its appurtenant structures remain as impediments to
the use of the surface, burdens which do not exist if the lease
is held undeveloped through the payment of delay rental. Surely
these factors justify fixing the shut-in payment at a figure many
times in excess of the delay rental.
Lawyers representing lessors should be conscious of a re-
lated pitfall in the form of a provision in some lease forms that
shut-in royalty payments are to be credited against royalties
thereafter accruing.'7 8  This defeats the object of the shut-in
payment as current compensation to the lessor for the legal and
physical burden placed currently upon his land by the well and
by the continuance of the lease.
Another clause against which the lessor should be warned,
if it appears in a lease he is asked to sign, reads as follows:
Provided, however, that if on such stated date this lease
is being maintained in force and effect otherwise than by
reason of any such shut-in gas well or shut-in gas wells,
Lessee shall not be obligated to pay or tender any such
sum of money as shut-in royalty.
It is not the law that diligence in operating for and market-
ing one product is excused because some other product is pro-
duced and marketed. 179 There is no reason why a lessor should
contract to give up a payment substituted for production and
marketing simply because income from another source is realized.
These provisions, like some others, exemplify an unjustifiable
tendency of integrated industry to consider the premises which
said lease on such stated date, and each such owner shall receive that
part thereof which is in the proportion that his royalty acreage inter-
est in said land bears to the total number of acres of land covered by
such lease on such stated date."
178 See the clause set out in note 170 supra.
179 See MlmtuRLL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES §§ 69, 79, 80
(2d ed. 1940), 69A (Supp. 1959).
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they hold under lease as the equivalent of an industrial plant
owned in fee.
G. SURRENDER PROVISIONS
Leases usually contain a clause authorizing surrender by the
lessee as to all or part of the premises. One such form reads as
follows:
Lessees may at any time and from time to time surrender
this lease as to any part or parts of the leased premises by
delivering or mailing a release thereof to the lessor, or by
placing a release thereof of record in the proper county.
This clause originated in the desire of lessees to have a way of
getting out from under continuing liability to pay delay rentals
on unwanted leases of the "or" variety.30 Its change to include
the privilege of partial release was to take care of other exigen-
cies. It represents a privilege of the lessee or his assignee.' 8 ' It
does not afford the lessor an opportunity to require surrender.182
Surrender may be effectuated only by strict compliance with the
specified formalities. 183 On the other hand, when these are per-
formed, the lessor-lessee relationship effectually is terminated. 8 4
It has been ruled that matured liability for the payment of delay
rentals is not absolved by surrender. 8 5 This same principle
should apply to liabilities for other defaults in the lessee's obli-
gations to his lessor. 8 6 Unfortunately, there are decisions which
seem to allow the lessee to use the partial surrender privilege to
escape such liabilities.'8 7 While these cases are indefensible, a
wise lessor will insist that the surrender clause be modified so as
expressly to forbid the avoidance of accrued liability by its exer-
cise.
180 See KuLp, Om. AND GAS RIGHTs 597 (1954); 2 SInvMERS, OIm AND GAS
131 (perm. ed. 1958).
181 McKee v. Grimm, 111 Okla. 24, 238 Pac. 835 (1925).
182 See 2 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS 383 (perm. ed. 1958). The cases cited in
support contain dicta only, but the principle is sound.
183 Farlow v. Frankson, 110 Kan. 197, 203 Pac. 299 (1922); Ardizzonne v.
Archer, 71 Okla. 289, 160 Pac. 446 (1916).
184 Osburn v. Finkelstein, 189 Ind. 90, 126 N.E. 11 (1920); Superior Oil Co.
v. Dabney, 147 Tex. 51, 211 S.W.2d 563 (1948).
185 Cases are collected in 2 SUnMERS, OIL AND GAS 402 n.70 (perm. ed.
1958).
186 Central States Prod. Corp. v. Jordan, 184 Okla. 262, 86 P.2d 790 (1939).
187 Plains Petroleum Corp. v. Fine, 174 Okla. 570, 51 P.2d 284 (1935);
Superior Oil Co. v. Dabney, 147 Tex. 51, 211 S.W.2d 563 (1948).
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H. REMOVAL OF EQUIPMENT
Upon the termination of the lease, the lessee ordinarily is
privileged within a reasonable time' 88 to remove his casing and
equipment from the premises. 18 9  Commonly, this is provided in
the lease. 190  A comprehensive clause of this sort, contained in
one form, reads:
At all times during the life of this lease and for a reason-
able time after the expiration of this lease, Lessee shall
have the right to remove all machinery, fixtures, houses,
buildings and other structures placed on said premises,
including the right to draw and remove all casing.
The lessee must, of course, perform any statutory obligation to
plug abandoned wells. 9 ' Apart from statute, he owes it to his
lessor to plug such wells to the extent necessary to prevent in-
jury to the subterranean strata. 9 2  Occasionally, there arises a
difference of opinion between lessor and lessee as to whether a
particular well may be continued in operation profitably. There
are cases holding that the lessee may not pull the casing from
such a well without giving the lessor opportunity to test it in
order to determine whether to undertake its operation. 93 The
logical corollary to this position, requiring the lessee to leave the
casing in the well, upon being paid a reasonable rental' 94 or
other compensation 195 therefor, has been applied in some cases.' 9
Other decisions seem to deny it.197 The first line of decision seems
justified, in analogy to the lessee's duty not to destroy a paying
well.' 98
188 Wilson v. Wilson, 280 Ky. 461, 133 S.W.2d 722 (1939); Shellar v.
Shivers, 171 Pa. 569, 33 Atl. 95 (1895).
1s9 In re Midland Oil Co., 3 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1924); Hammons v. Pure
Oil Co., 309 Ky. 495, 218 S.W.2d 22 (1949); Tyler v. Wilhite, 97 Okla.
159, 222 Pac. 997 (1923).
190 Wade v. Lillard, 201 Okla. 520, 207 P.2d 771 (1949) exemplifies such
a provision.
'91 Nisbet v. Van Tuyl, 224 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1955).
192 Warner v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 132 Kan. 837, 297 Pac. 682 (1931).
193 Warner v. Shell Petroluemn Corp., supra note 192.
194 Okmulgee Supply Corp. v. Anthis, 189 Okla. 139, 114 P.2d 451 (1941).
195 Sparks v. Ward, 322 S.W.2d 461 (Ky. 1959) (agreed compensation).
196 Powers v. Bridgeport Oil Co., 238 Ill. 397, 87 N.E. 381 (1909); Okmul-
gee Supply Corp. v. Anthis, 189 Okla. 139, 114 P.2d 451 (1941).
197 Collins v. Mt. Pleasant Oil & Gas Co., 85 Kan. 483, 118 Pac. 54, 38 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 134 (1911).
198 Warner v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 132 Kan. 837, 297 Pac. 682 (1931);
Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co. v. Callender, 84 Mont. 178, 274 Pac. 834 (1929).
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It is held in most jurisdictions that the lessee is under no
duty to the lessor to restore the premises to their former con-
dition or to remove his structures at the termination of the
lease. 199 Statutes sometimes impose such an obligation.20 0 Where
they do not exist, it would be wise for lessors to insist upon the
inclusion of a clause requiring removal and restoratiom 201 Fre-
quently the land is left with incumbering ruins and other condi-
tions impeding its use for other purposes.
20 2
IV. DEVELOPMENT, OPERATION AND
ROYALTY PROVISIONS
A. IMP IED COVENANTS
The lease usually is silent with respect to developmental and
operational obligations, apart from the "drilling clause" already
discussed. This results partly from the fact that lessors usually
are not in position, economic or knowledgeable, to chaffer effect-
ually with lessees over such matters. Partly, it results from the
fact that many leases are taken by brokers or speculators who
are in no position to insert special agreements in the standard-
ized forms. Partly, too, and this, perhaps, is the most impelling
factor, the parties, no matter how cognizant of the oil business,
usually are in no position to determine in advance a specific pro-
gram of development and operation.20 3  Occasionally, a lessor is
able to stipulate for a binding promise to drill one or more test
wells. 20 4  A generally accepted measure of damages for breach
of such a promise is the cost of the agreed-for drilling,20 5 but
199 Duvanel v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 170 Kan. 483, 227 P.2d 88 (1951); Black
Gold Petroleum Co. v. Hill, 188 Okla. 329, 108 P.2d 784 (1940); Warren
Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 304 S.W.2d 362, 65 A.L.R.2d
1352 (1957).
200 See ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 466(12) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-132a (Supp. 1959).
201 Provisions which have been effective will be found in Danker v. Lee,
137 Cal. App. 2d 797, 291 P.2d 73 (4th Dist. 1955); Oceana Oil Prod-
cers v. Portland Silo Co., 229 Ind. 656, 100 N.E.2d 895 (1951).
202 As in Fox v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 201 Okla. 17, 200 P.2d 398 (1948).
203 See MERRILL, COVENANTS ImPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES §§ 2, 61 (2d
ed. 1940).
204 For instances of such stipulations, see cases cited in MERRILL, Op. cit.
supra note 203, at 50 n.8, and in supplements thereto.
205 Stannard v. Reynolds, 179 Kan. 394, 295 P.2d 610 (1956); Brown v.
Homestake Exploration Corp., 98 Mont. 305, 39 P.2d 168 (1934); Smith
v. Kious, 194 Okla. 17, 147 P.2d 442 (1944).
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there are other rules20 6 and controversy rages as to their respec-
tive merits.2 0 7  Obviously, any reasonable attempt to stipulate
a liquidation measure will be sustained. 20 8
In some instances, chiefly where prior activity has given a
basis for assessment of what may be encountered, leases, modi-
fications of existent leases, or renewal leases, contain specific
programs for development. 20 9 These must be complied with,
even though later knowledge suggests the effort's uselessness.
210
In that great majority of instances in which the leases con-
tain no provision, the courts decide the controversies arising be-
tween the lessors and the lessees over the proper administration
of the mineral enterprise by what are called the implied cove-
nants of the lease.2 1 1 There are conflicting decisions as to wheth-
er the implications are of fact 212 or of law.2 13 The impossibility
of ascribing to either party either the mental state or the ob-
jective manifestation appropriate to the implied in fact con-
tract 21 4 convinces me that the latter alternative is preferable. 215
The practical significance of this logomachy is very limited. It
may have some bearing upon the solution of certain problems
under some statutes of limitations.2 16  As we shall see later, it
affects certain questions of liability in case of assignment or
206 See 3 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 434 (perm. ed. 1958); MERRILL, op. cit.
supra note 203, § 153.
207 See the discussion in Fite v. Miller, 192 La. 229, 187 So. 650 (1939);
Annot., 122 A.L.R. 446 (1939).
20. Lorraine Petroleum Co. v. Bartlett, 138 Okla. 8, 280 Pac. 286 (1929).
209 Examples of such stipulations may be found in the cases cited in MER-
RILL, op. cit. supra note 203, at 129 n.1 and supplement thereto.
210 Mollohan v. Patton, 110 Kan. 663, 205 Pac. 643 (1922).
211 These are discussed in detail in MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL
AND GAS LEASES (2d ed. 1940) and the supplements to that work. A
short survey of the field occurs in Merrill, Implied Covenants in Oil
and Gas Leases, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 584.
212 Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rosamond, 190 Okla. 46, 120
P.2d 349, 138 A.L.R. 246 (1941); Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. of Texas v.
Powell, 137 Tex. 484, 154 S.W.2d 632, 137 A.L.R. 408 (1941).
213 Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272 (1934); George
v. Franklin, 219 Ky. 377, 292 S.W. 1093 (1927).
214 See 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 17-19 (1950); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3
(3d ed. 1957). In these situations, the duty defines the contract rather
than the reverse. Cf. Justice Lowrie in Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 564
(1857).
215 MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES 463 (2d ed. 1940).
216 Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rosamond, 190 Okla. 46, 120
P.2d 349 (1941); Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Stuard, 7 S.W.2d 878 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928).
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subleasing. Perhaps, too, judges who recognize that the obliga-
tions arise out of law may be more resourceful in dealing with
the problems than those who think they merely are giving effect
to what the parties had in mind. However, in most instances, legal
theorizing about the basis of the obligations seems to play no
acknowledged or recognizable part in their application. It is
noteworthy that the origin of these obligations antedates the oil
industry,2 17 and that they still find frequent application to other
minerals.21
What are these covenants? Opinions differ as to numbers
and nomenclature. 219 Personally, I classify them as four in num-
ber: (1) to explore; 220  (2) to develop further after explor-
ing;22 1 (3) to operate diligently after development (including
the obligation to market the product) ,222 and (4) to protect the
premises against drainage from wells on neighboring land.223
While these obligations primarily were applied in favor of lessors
as against lessees, the true conception probably is that they run in
favor of all those possessing non-working interests dependent
for their value upon the diligence with which the working in-
terest is operated.224  A recent federal case 225 indicates that the
principle is applicable to an agent who is compensated from
natural gas sales.
(1) Duty of Exploration
The covenant for exploration has become of comparatively
little significance today, with the prevalence of short fixed term
leases permitting delay of exploration upon payment of money.
These provisions, with some dissent,22 6 are construed generally
217 The early cases are collected in Merrill, Implied Covenants in Oil and
Gas Leases, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 584 nn.1 & 3.
218 The cases involving other than petrolific minerals will be found in
MER L, op. cit. supra note 215, § 218 n.10.
219 See MERRILL, op. cit. supra note 215, § 4.
220 MtRRILL, op. cit. supra note 215, ch. II.
221 MERRILL, op. cit. supra note 215, ch. IH.
222 MERRILL, op. cit. supra note 215, ch. IV.
223 IERRLL, op. cit. supra note 215, ch. V.
224 See MEImtLL, supra note 217, at 585.
225 White v. New York State Natural Gas Corp., 191 F. Supp. 38 (W.D.
Pa. 1958).
226 Huggins v. Daley, 99 Fed. 606 (4th Cir. 1900); Allegheny Oil Co. v.
Snyder, 106 Fed. 764 (6th Cir. 1900); Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. Lit-
tler, 162 Ind. 320, 70 N.E. 363 (1904); Monarch Oil, Gas & Coal Co. v.
Richardson, 124 Ky. 602, 99 S.W. 668 (1907).
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as superseding the implied covenant for exploration. 227 Occasion-
ally, however, a document drawn after the models of the older
day is brought into court, and, if the lawyers and judges are not
familiar with the requirements of the covenant for exploration,
bizzare results may occur.228  Also, the covenant assumes im-
portance when widely scattered tracts are incorporated in the
same lease. Production from one tract will hold the lease in
effect without regard to the payment of delay rentals or the
expiry of the fixed term.229  The implied covenant for explora-
tion, however, requires diligent search for production to be made
upon the other tracts. 230  Unfamiliarity with the exploration
principle may lead to improper results in a case of this type.231
(2) Duty of Further Development
The covenant for further development, simply stated, re-
quires that the lessee, after drilling the exploratory well, shall
carry on such further operations as are reasonably necessary to
develop the productive capacity of the premises.232 The duty
may be imposed even though the first well is dry,233 although
the advent of resumption clauses, and the like, of which we
have spoken earlier, are likely to supersede it.234
227 Rose v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 68 Kan. 126, 74 Pac. 625 (1903); Lloyd's Es-
tate v. Mullen Tractor & Equip. Co., 192 Miss. 62, 4 So. 2d 282 (1941);
Southwestern Oil Co. v. McDaniel, 71 Okla. 142, 175 Pac. 90 (1918).
228 As, for example, in State ex rel. Comm'rs of the Land Office v. Couch,
298 P.2d 452 (Okla. 1956) (implication of exploratory covenant de-
feated by cash bonus); Gay v. Grinnan, 218 S.W.2d 1021 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1949) (no covenant to explore, under ninety-nine year lease on
land in wildcat territory).
2229 Hunt v. McWilliams, 218 Ark. 922, 240 S.W.2d 865 (1951); Spikes v.
Weller, 159 Kan. 597, 156 P.2d 540 (1945); State v. Worden, 44 N.M.
400, 103 P.2d 124 (1940).
230 Drummond v. Alphin, 176 Ark. 1052, 4 S.W.2d 942 (1928); Alford v.
Dennis, 102 Kan. 403, 170 Pac. 1005 (1918); Sohio Petroleum Co. v.
Miller, 237 La. 1013, 12 So. 2d 695 (1959); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Vaughn, 195 Okla. 662, 161 P.2d 762 (1945).
231 As in Clayton v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 150 F. Supp. 9 (D.N.M. 1957), de-
cided in apparently complete oblivity of State v. Worden, 44 N.M. 400,
103 P.2d 124 (1940).
232 Mountain States Oil Corp. v. Sandoval, 109 Colo. 401, 125 P.2d 964
(1942); Berry v. Wondra, 173 Kan. 273, 246 P.2d 282 (1952); Petroleum
Producers Co. v. Steffens, 139 Tex. 257, 162 S.W.2d 698 (1942).
233 Cf. Ohio Oil Co. v. Detamore, 165 Ind. 243, 73 N.E. 906 (1905); Steel-
smith v. Gartlan, 45 W. Va. 27, 29 S.E. 978, 44 L.R.A. 107 (1898).
234 Miles v. Ashby, 295 Ky. 500, 174 S.W.2d 753 (1943).
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(3) Duty of Diligent Operation
When production is achieved, the covenant for diligent opera-
tion comes into play. This covenant imposes on the lessee a num-
ber of duties. He must complete,235 properly23 6 and within a
reasonable time,23 7 wells showing favorable prospects 23 8 of pro-
duction.239 He should test all sands from which a yield is like-
ly.240  If production needs to be stimulated, appropriate 241 and
efficient 242 means should be used. A profitable well ought not
to be abandoned, 243 and we have seen that the lessee may be un-
der a duty to leave casing in a well which he feels worthy of
abandonment, if the lessor desires to try his hand.244  A failing
well should be restored if possible.
245
Since the lessor's return depends upon royalties out of pro-
duction, the lessee should market the product.246 He must seek
markets diligently 247 even, perhaps, to installing facilities to
get the product to the market,248 and he should realize the best
possible price. 249 Preparation of the product for the market, if
this is necessary, also is the lessee's duty.25 0
(4) Duty to Protect Against Drainage
Since oil or gas may be drained away through operations on
neighboring land, the lessee is under obligation to drill such pro-
235 Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 248 Ky. 646, 59 S.W.2d 534 (1933).
236 Indiana Oil, Gas & Dev. Co. v. McCrory, 42 Okla. 136, 140 Pac. 610
(1914).
237 Slater v. Boyd, 120 Cal. App. 457, 8 P.2d 182 (3d Dist. 1931).
238 Ohio Oil Co. v. Reichert, 343 Ill. 560, 175 N.E. 790 (1932) (no prospect).
239 Empire Oil & Ref. Co. v. Hoyt, 112 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1940).
240 Donaldson v. Josey Oil Co., 106 Okla. 11, 232 Pac. 821 (1925).
241 Unity Oil Co. v. Hill, 200 Ky. 651, 255 S.W. 151 (1923) (necessity to
show appropriateness of method).
242 Brennan v. Carter, 296 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. 1956).
243 Gallaspy v. Warner, 324 P.2d 848 (Okla. 1958).
244 See the discussion in the division dealing with duration of the lease.
245 Smith v. Moody, 192 Ark. 704, 94 S.W.2d 357 (1936).
246 Matzen v. Hugoton Prod. Co., 182 Kan. 456, 321 P.2d 576 (1958); Town-
send v. Creekmore-Rooney Co., 332 P.2d 35 (Okla. 1958). This rule
was applied to a gravel lease in George v. Jones, 168 Neb. 149, 95 N.W.
2d 609 (1959).
247 Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1936).
248 See discussion in MERmLL, CovENANTS ImPLmD iN Om. AND GAS L_ sES
§ 87 (2d ed. 1940).
249 Young v. West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, 275 P.2d 304 (Okla. 1954).
250 See MEFRaIL, op. cit. supra note 248, § 85.
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tection wells as are necessary reasonably to protect against such
loss. 25 ' Some authority indicates that the obligation is greater
if the lessee owns the robber wells, 252 but I have never been able
to see any sense to this distinction.253 Some leases contain ex-
press provisions for offsetting wells within a certain distance
from the boundaries.25 4  There is a tendency in some jurisdic-
tions to regard these provisions as setting the standard for pro-
tection, so that, no matter how much drainage actually may occur
through wells more distantly situated, there is no duty to give
protection.25 5  The true purpose of these provisions, and the
meaning they are most likely to have for the lessor, is that they
set a minimal standard only.256  It is the sounder policy so to
regard them.
257
B. STANDARDS TESTING IMPLIED COVENANTS
The standards by which to test performance of the implied
covenant obligations vary. Where the covenant for exploration
exists, it is pretty much an absolute duty, regardless of cost 258
or of probable success. 259  With respect to the other covenants,
two standards have competed for judicial favor: the discretion
of the operator, exercised in good faith,2 60 and the judicially
251 Millette v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 209 Miss. 687, 48 So. 2d 344 (1950);
Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty, 71 Okla. 275, 177 Pac. 104 (1918).
252 Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163
(1937); Swope v. Holmes, 169 La. 17, 124 So. 131 (1929).
253 See MERRILL, op. cit. supra note 248, at 260.
254 A rather typical provision reads: "In the event a well or wells prod-
ucing oil or gas in paying quantities should be brought in on adjacent
land and within three hundred thirty (330) feet of and draining the
leased premises, lessee agrees to drill such offset wells as a reasonably
prudent operator would drill under the same or similar circumstances.
The judgment of the lessee, when not fraudulently exercised, in carry-
ing out the purposes of this lease shall be conclusive."
255 Coats v. Brown, 301 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). Cf. Millette v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 209 Miss. 687, 48 So. 2d 344 (1950).
256 See discussion in Merrill, Lease Clauses Affecting Implied Covenants,
SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 2D ANNUAL INST. ON OiL & GAS L.
& TAX 141, 173 (1951).
257 Hutchins v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 161 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942). Cf. the sensible discussion in Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Master-
son, 271 F.2d 310, 323 (5th Cir. 1959), relating to a minimum program
for development.
258 Fox Petroleum Co. v. Booker, 123 Okla. 276, 253 Pac. 33 (1927).
259 See MERMLL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § 46 (2d ed.
1940).
260 See MERRILL, Op. cit. supra note 259, §§ 125-33.
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interpreted standard of the conduct of the reasonably prudent
operator, having regard to the interests of both the lessor and
the lessee, in the light of all relevant circumstances. 261 The latter
represents the great weight of authority.2 62
Under normal circumstances, great weight is to be given to
the probable profitability, to the operator, of the action sought
to be imposed upon him under this test.26 3 The reasons are ob-
vious. Private business cannot survive if it continually must
operate in disregard of cost. But there are numerous instances in
which the courts disregard the factor of probable profitability
in the light of other factors deemed significant in the particular
case. These factors are too diverse for detailed discussion here.20 4
C. REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED COVEANTS
The remedies for breach of the implied covenants are varied.
In some instances the award of damages is deemed appropriate.2 65
In others, the difficulty of ascertaining damages makes equitable
relief by way of cancellation of the lease, wholly2 6 or partially,26 7
as to al12 68 or only as to some strata,2 69 the appropriate remedy.
The alternative decree, by which the lessee is given the oppor-
tunity to comply with his judicially determined duty and thereby
to avoid cancellation, is coming into judicial favor.2 7 0  This form
of relief affords opportunity for adjustments so as to accord com-
plete justice.2 7 1 Mandatory injunctions, 72 receiverships 273 and
declaratory judgments 274 are other forms of relief that have been
used in enforcement of the implied covenant obligations.
261 See MERmuL, op. cit. supra note 259, §§ 122, 123.
262 See MERniLL, op. cit. supra note 259, § 136.
268 See MEmUim, op. cit. supra note 259, § 124.
264 For a treatment of the subject, see Merrill, The Implied Covenant of
Further Exploration, 4 RocKY MT. MunERAL LAw INST. 205 (1959).
265 See MERRmLL, op. cit. supra note 259, §§ 148-58.
266 See MTEsUmL, op. cit. supra note 259, §§ 159-66.
267 Libby v. DeBaca, 51 N.M. 95, 179 P.2d 263 (1947).
268 Elliott v. Pure Oil Co., 10 I. 2d 146, 139 N.E.2d 295 (1956).
269 Carter Oil Co. v. Mitchell, 100 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1939).
270 See ME=uLu, op. cit. supra note 259, §§ 168-71.
271 See MERRmIL, op. cit. supra note 259, § 172.
272 See MTERRmL, op. cit. supra note 259, § 173.
273 See MERRI ,, op. cit. supra note 259, § 175.
274 See MEtmL, op. cit. supra note 259, § 174.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 41, 1962
D. ROYALTIEs
Royalties, as we have seen, afford the means through which
the lessor receives his return if the land is developed. Customari-
ly, the royalty is set at one-eighth of the oil,275 although larger
or smaller fractions sometimes are specified . 2 7 6  In what now
seems like a far-off day, when gas was regarded as more of a
liability than as an asset, the usual gas royalty was prescribed
as a small cash sum for each well, on a periodic basis.277 Now,
with gas perhaps more valuable than oil, lessors insist upon
having it put upon a share royalty basis also, and the lease forms
reflect this change.2 7 8  The terms vary. Sometimes the lessor's
share of the gas is to be valued at a fixed price.27 9  This, of
course, is undesirable for him in a time of rising prices. Some-
times the price is fixed in terms of market value,2 8 0 which often
raises difficult problems when no market exists at the well-
head.28 '1 Too, a clause giving the lessor one-eighth of the "pro-
ceeds" may raise serious doubt concerning its effect on the les-
see's duty to get the best price.2 2 The royalty clause should be
so framed as to secure to the lessor his proportionate share of
the product of the well, regardless of the conditions under which
it is marketed or the processing through which it goes on the way
to market. In many instances the gas is laden with extractable
"wet" elements. This adds to its value, and complicates the task
of writing royalty provisions. Some forms seem drafted with a
view to cutting the lessor off from fully sharing in these valu-
able components of his gas.28 3 Probably the ideal clause dealing
275 See 3A SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS 128 (perm. ed. 1958).
276 As in Alamitos Land Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 3 Cal. 2d 396, 44 P.2d 573
(1935).
277 See BROWN, OIL AND GAS LEASES 97 (1958).
278 See 3A SUMMERS, OM AND GAS 109 (perm. ed. 1958).
279 O'Neal v. Union Producing Co., 153 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1946).
280 Haynes v. Southwest Natural Gas Co., 123 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1941);
Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 184 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1950).
281 Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944) (prices paid
on other leases evidentiary of market price); Union Producing Co. v.
Pardue, 117 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1941) (effect of controlled market);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1946) (evi-
dentiary value of public utility pipe line contracts).
282 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Record, 146 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1944).
283 Example: "If gas, including oil-well or casinghead gas and any gase-
ous substances produced from any well, is used off of the leased prem-
ises by the Lessee for any purposes, or is used on the leased premises
by the Lessee for purposes other than the development and operation
thereof, then Lessee shall pay Lessor therefor one-eighth (1/8) of the
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with these problems is yet to be written. With this problem in
mind lawyers, representing prospective lessors should be very
careful to inspect the tendered form.28 4
Royalty payments may become divided, as the result of de-
fects in title, or of the conveyance of undivided interests, or of
the subsequent subdivision of the land. Various provisions have
been inserted in the common forms to take care of these situa-
tions.
(1) "Lesser Interest" Clause
One of these clauses is the so-called "lesser interest" or
"proportionate reduction" clause. One such clause reads:
If said lessor own a less interest in the above described
land than the entire and undivided fee simple estate
therein, then the royalties and rentals herein provided
shall be paid the lessor only in the proportion which his
interest bears to the whole and undivided fee.
A more sophisticated clause is couched in these terms:
In case said lessor owns a less interest in the above des-
cribed land than the entire and undivided fee simple es-
tate therein, then the royalties and rentals therein pro-
vided for shall be paid the said lessor only in the pro-
portion that his interest bears to the whole and undivided
fee; however, such rental shall be increased at the next
succeeding rental anniversary after any reversion occurs
to cover the interest so acquired, and lessor agrees to
notify lessee in writing upon acquisition of any rever-
sionary interest.
Coupled with this may be something in this form:
With respect to the payment of and the right to receive
delay rentals and royalties (including shut-in gas royal-
ties), it is agreed that the termination of a life estate,
term mineral interest or other precedent estate whereby
the Lessor shall come into possession or use of an interest
in said land shall, subject to all the provisions of this
market value thereof at the mouth of the well. Such payments shall
be received and accepted by Lessor as full compensation for all such
gas, oil-well or casinghead gas, helium, hydrogen sulphide and all gas-
eous substances, whether or not combustible, and any and all products
extracted or manufactured therefrom including the residue gas re-
maining."
284 See ME muiL, CovENANT, IMPLiED IN O. Am GAS LEAsEs § 89A (Supp.
1959) for discussion of problems arising where the lessee uses the
product.
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lease, become effective from and after the date when
such Lessor shall have furnished satisfactory evidence to
Lessee showing the termination of such life estate, term
mineral interest or other precedent estate, but for all
other purposes this lease shall cover such interest as and
when the Lessor shall so come into the possession or use
of it.
There are many variations on this general theme. Serious
problems can arise out of the application of such clauses to par-
ticular situations.285 The form used should be carefully checked
with respect to those events which reasonably may be antici-
pated, to make sure that unexpected and undesired applications
may be avoided.
A problem of frequent occurrence arises where the surface
of the land, and the mineral interest pertaining thereto, is sub-
divided after the execution of the lease. While some authority
exists to the contrary,28 6 the great weight of decision holds that
all the royalty from a well drilled on Subdivision I goes to the
owner of that tract,28 7 leaving the owner of Subdivision II without
any compensation, although his land continues to be bound by the
lease so long as production continues on the other tract.28 8 More-
over, he may be unable to require a well upon his own tract,
because the conditions on which the implied covenant obligation
depends are lacking.2 9
(2) Entirety Clause
To avoid such an injustice, the so-called "entirety clause" 290
has been fashioned. A common phraseology reads in this wise:
If the leased premises shall hereafter be owned in sever-
alty, or in separate tracts, the premises, nevertheless,
shall be developed and operated as one lease, and all
285 See Williams, The Effect of Concurrent Interests on Oil and Gas Trans-
actions, 34 TEX. L. REV. 519, 528-34 (1956).
286 Wettengel v. Gormley, 160 Pa. 559, 28 Atl. 934 (1894).
287 Central Pipe Line Co. v. Huston, 401 Ill. 447, 82 N.E.2d 624 (1948);
Kimbley v. Luckey, 72 Okla. 217, 179 Pac. 928 (1919); Japhet v. McRae,
276 S.W. 669 (Tex. Com. App. 1925). The rule was stated in Rauner
v. Jones, 159 Neb. 385, 67 N.W.2d 347 (1954).
288 Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Baker, 197 F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1952); Garza
v. de Montalvo, 147 Tex. 525, 217 S.W.2d 988 (1949).
289 Cochran v. Gulf Ref. Co., 139 La. 1010, 72 So. 718 (1916); Galt v. Met-
scher, 103 Okla. 271, 229 Pac. 522 (1924).
290 See W.LAmS & MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERms 85 (1957).
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royalties accuring hereunder shall be treated as an en-
tirety, and shall be divided among and paid to such sep-
arate owners in the proportion that the acreage owned
by each such separate owner bears to the entire leased
acreage. There shall be no obligation on the part of the
lessee to offset wells on separate tracts into which the
land covered by this lease may be hereafter divided by
sale, devise, or otherwise, or to furnish separate measur-
ing or receiving tanks.
The consequences flowing from the execution of a lease con-
taining an entirety clause are that, in case of subsequent sub-
division of the leased premises, the royalties resulting from de-
velopment are apportioned according to the shares of the acre-
age of the mineral interest owned by each participant in the
title.2 91 There is some authority that this effect does not extend
to allowing the subsequent holder of a mere royalty interest in
production from a specified portion of the leased premises to
share in royalty based on production elsewhere on the land.292
This is a quaint diversity, however, that seems to make no real
sense and is not to be commended. 293 Some entirety clauses are
so drawn as to be applicable to existing divisions of interest.2 94
This affords needed relief in situations such as those created
where the entire executive right is vested in one who owns the
mineral interest as to part, only, of the premises.
The advantages of the entirety clause are, on the one hand,
the avoidance of the inequities to holders of subdivided interests
under the nonapportionment rule295 and, on the other hand, that
the lessee is absolved from the necessity of keeping track of
production from the several divisions for the purpose of paying
royalties,2 90 and also is relieved from difficulties arising out of
the misconceptions of the various tract owners concerning the
291 Hoffman v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 179 Kan. 84, 292 P.2d 1107 (1956);
Rauner v. Jones, 159 Neb. 385, 67 N.W.2d 347 (1954); Gypsy Oil Co. v.
Schonwald, 107 Okla. 253, 231 Pac. 864 (1924).
292 Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Carter, 187 La. 382, 175 So. 1 (1937). Cf.
Rauner v. Jones, 159 Neb. 385, 67 N.W.2d 347 (1954).
293 See 2 WILLmsS & IEYERs, O. AND GAS LAw 678 (1959).
294 Such a clause is construed in Thomas Gilcrease Foundation v. Stano-
lind Oil & Gas Co., 153 Tex. 197, 266 S.W.2d 850 (1954).
295 See 3A Sm snas, Or. Am GAS 444 (perm. ed. 1958).
296 See Adoue, Royalty and Pooling Provisions in Oil, Gas and Mineral
Leases, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION INST. 2D ANNUAL INST. ON
On. & GAS L. & TAX 195, 225 (1951).
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amount of development respectively due them.297  These last
advantages probably account for the introduction of the entirety
clause into lease forms.
There are situations, however, in which the existence of an
entirety clause may redound to the harm of the lessor. One such
instance may result it production is achieved from part only of
the leased premises or if the wells on part of the land are greatly
more productive than those elsewhere. If he has an opportunity
to sell the less productive part of the tract, the owner doubtless
will wish to free the retained portion from the dilutive effect of
the entirety clause. Apparently, in most jurisdictions, he may do
this by clearly indicating such an intent in his conveyance2 98 or
in some other effective instrument.299  In a few jurisdictions,3 0 0
including Nebraska,30 ' however, this is considered an imper-
missible unilateral impairment of the lease contract if the lessee
does not assent. In such jurisdictions, prospective lessors, before
accepting an entirety clause, certainly should consider carefully
whether they desire inescapably to bind themselves by the pat-
tern established thereby.
Provisions designed to protect the lessee against liability for
royalty payments which are erroneously made because of un-
known changes in ownership frequently occur in modern forms.
Here is a well-drawn example:
But no change in the ownership of said land or of any
rights hereunder shall be binding upon the Lessee until
thirty (30) days after the Lessee has been furnished with
(1) the original or a certified copy of the recorded
transfer or assignment thereof, or (2) in case of the
death of the Lessor with (a) a certified copy of letters
of administration issued on his estate by the Probate
Court having jurisdiction of said land, or (b) with a cer-
tified copy of the last Will of Lessor, and the certificate
of proof of the same and of the order of the Probate
297 See 2 WILLmMs & MaERs, OM AND GAS LAW 675 (1959); 3A SUMMERS,
OIL AND GAS 431 (perm. ed. 1958).
298 Iskian v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 207 Okla. 615, 251 P.2d 1073
(1952).
299 Alsip's Adm'r v. Onstott, 283 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1955).
300 Harley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 378 Ill. 19, 37 N.E.2d 760 (1941)
(reservation).
301 Hafeman v. Gem Oil Co., 163 Neb. 438, 80 N.W.2d 139 (1956) (mineral
deed); Krone v. Lacy, 168 Neb. 792, 97 N.W.2d 528 (1959) (mineral
deed, assignment of royalties).
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Court having jurisdiction of said land admitting said Will
to probate, together with a certified copy of letters testa-
mentary issued to the executor or administrator of his es-
tate, or (c) if rentals only are involved, with an instru-
ment in recordable form satisfactory to the Lessee and ex-
ecuted by the Lessor's heirs and devisees, if any, showing
the date of death of Lessor and the names, relationship
and identity of Lessor's heirs and authorizing and direct-
ing to whom the payment, deposit or tender of rentals
may be paid hereunder.
Such provisions are eminently reasonable. So far, no liti-
gation concerning their meaning seems to have arisen.
Less defensible, from the lessor's point of view, is a stipula-
tion requiring the appointment of an agent or trustee to receive
and distribute payments in the event of substantial multiplica-
tion of persons entitled thereto.
If at any time there be as many as four parties entitled
to royalties (including shut-in gas royalty) Lessee may
withhold payments thereof unless and until all parties
furnish to and file with the Lessee a recordable instru-
ment satisfactory to Lessee and appointing a common
agent to receive all payments due such parties hereunder,
and appointing such common agent -to execute division
and transfer orders on behalf of said parties, and their
respective successors in interest.
To the lessee, these subdivisions may constitute a terrific burden.
346,801
I have seen fractional interests like this: 1/6750 of 18,726,912 of
the usual 1/8 royalty interest in a 160 acre tract. One cannot
blame the lessee for wishing to achieve relief from the task of
computing payments and writing checks in such a situation.
On the other hand, multiple division of interests on such a
scale creates an almost impossible task of getting in the neces-
sary assents from owners scattered all over the world. Likewise,
the inevitable incident of death easily may result in four or
more persons entitled to share in royalties under a lease origi-
nating in an undivided ownership. There may be one or more
recalcitrants in such a group, who will not agree to the agent de-
sired by the others. The prospect of an impasse blocking pay-
ment of royalties for a long time lurks in clauses of this sort.
Skilled draftsmanship might produce a provision better adapted
to reconciling the interests of lessors and lessees, but to date I
have seen nothing that seems to accomplish that purpose.
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V. TRANSFERABILITY OF LEASE RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS
The obligations owed the lessor under the lease belong to
him in his capacity as owner of the estate out of which the
lease interest is carved. He can grant them to another or if he con-
veys his interest generally they pass with it.30 2 There is no
dissent, that I know of, to these propositions. Likewise, the
lessee owns a valuable property interest, which is assignable, in
all states,303 unless there is a stipulation against assignment.30 4
Based on an unfortunate analogy to a supposed principle of the
ancient land law,3 0 5 however, there was some doubt concerning
the validity of a partial assignment of a lease, if the lessee had
no estate in the oil and gas30 6 but merely a right to enter and
take.30 7  From this doubt arose the clause, commonly found in
lease forms, stating that "the privilege of assigning in whole or
in part is expressly allowed." The consequence today is that the
assignability of the lessee's interest, "in whole or in part," is
recognized without discussion.308 The assignment carries to the
assignee whatever interest his assignor had under the lease, as
to the entire tract 30 9 or as to that portion covered by a partial
assignment.3 10
The obligations of the express covenants of the lease run
with the land, and so are enforcible against the assignee.3 11 Cer-
tain special problems, however, arise under partial assignments.
For instance, it generally is considered that the necessity to pay
rentals to keep an "unless" lease alive is indivisible, so that, after
a partial assignment, the partial assignee may not preserve the
lease as to his acreage by tendering payment of his proportion
302 See 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAw 438 (1959).
303 Watts v. England, 168 Ark. 213, 269 S.W. 585 (1925); Chandler v. Hart,
161 Cal. 405, 119 Pac. 516 (1911); Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
156 Kan. 367, 133 P.2d 95 (1943).
304 Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Guertzgen, 100 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1938).
305 See Merrill, The Partial Assignee-Done in Oil, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 298,
299 (1942).
306 Bronson v. Lane, 91 Pa. 153 (1879).
307 Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229 (1866).
308 Mistletoe Oil & Gas Co. v. Revelle, 117 Okla. 144, 245 Pac. 620 (1926).
309 Ball v. Coyle, 108 Okla. 30, 233 Pac. 750 (1925).
310 Bronson v. Lane, 91 Pa. 153 (1879).
311 Hafeman v. Gem Oil Co., 163 Neb. 438, 80 N.W.2d 139 (1956). The au-
thorities are fully collected in 3 SuMMEs, OIL AND GAS § 553 (perm.
ed. 1958).
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of the rentals. 312 Some cases make a distinction if the lease con-
tains a partial assignment clause.3 13 This seems inadequately
grounded in principle, however.314  The partial assignee's privi-
lege to preserve his interest by paying a proportionate rental
may be secured, however, by some such stipulation as this:
* . .and it is hereby agreed that in the event this lease
shall be assigned as to a part or as to parts of the above
described lands and the assignee or assignees of such part
or parts shall fail or make default in the payment of the
proportionate part of the rental due from him or them,
[or in the performance or any of the obligations of this
contract,] such default shall not operate to defeat or
affect this lease in so far as it covers a part or parts of
said lands upon which the said lessee or any assignee[s]
thereof shall make due payment of said rental [and due
performance of the obligations of this contract].
The words within the brackets are absent in some forms.
-The effectiveness of this sort of provision stands adjudicated.31 5
If we may judge by the approving citation 16 accorded to an
earlier case relating to the duty of a partial assignee of an agri-
cultural lease,317 it is possible that Nebraska will hold the delay
rental privilege to be divisible. 313 It seems certain that, under an
"or" lease, the obligation to pay will be so considered.319
As to development, drilling a well on one part of the divided
lease suffices to absolve the payment of delay rentals on all the
tracts.320 Production on one part will hold the lease in effect
as to all.321
812 Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 55 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1932). Cf. Kugel
v. Young, 132 Colo. 529, 291 P.2d 695 (1955); Flanigan v. Stern, 204 Ky.
814, 265 S.W. 324 (1924); Phoenix Oil Co. v. Mid-Continent Petroleum
Corp., 177 Okla. 530, 60 P.2d 1054 (1936).
813 Armstrong v. McGough, 157 Ark. 173, 247 S.W. 790, 29 A.L.R. 236
(1923). Cf. Logan v. California Co., 231 Miss. 836, 97 So. 2d 924 (1957);
Hitson v. Gilman, 220 S.W. 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
314 See Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil
and Gas Lease in Texas, 10 TEXAS L. REv. 291, 317 (1932).
315 Dormon Farms Co. v. Stewart, 157 Ark. 194, 247 S.W. 778 (1923).
316 See Hafeman v. Gem Oil Co., 163 Neb. 438, 80 N.W.2d 139 (1956).
317 Hogg v. Reynolds, 61 Neb. 758, 86 N.W. 479 (1901).
8 The decision, of course, is not specifically apt, since it involved an
obligation rather than a privilege.
319 On the obligation under the "or" lease, see Merrill, The Partial As-
signee-Done in Oil, 20 TEXAs L. REv. 298, 305 (1942).
820 Wilson v. Texas Co., 147 Kan. 449, 76 P.2d 779 (1938).
321 State ex rel. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Worden, 44 N.M. 400, 103 P.2a
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The implied covenants of the lease, though imposed by law,
run with the land in the same way, and the assignee, if of the
whole lease, is liable for their performance. 22  The partial as-
signee is liable for failure to perform as to his part.323  But may
the leasehold be split, so that adequate performance by the
owner of one portion saves his interest, despite default by the
owners of other portions?3 24 As to this, it has been well said that
"the authorities are not harmonious. '3 25  The cases sustaining
divisibility3 2 6 seem more in harmony with concepts of the oil
business.3 2 7  It probably does not make much difference in re-
sult, however, in the long run.328
Does the lessee-assignor continue liable for breach of cove-
nants? As to express covenants, the analogy to the law of land-
lord and tenant32 9 has been held to impose continued liability.330
As to implied covenants, if the implication be regarded as one of
law, the want of privity of estate, as distinguished from privity
of contract, would absolve the assignor.3 3 1  If they are regarded
as implied in fact, there is privity of estate, and liability con-
tinues.3 3 2 But the practice of the oil business is against this con-
cept, and I venture to suggest that it should not be applied.3 33
124 (1940); Pierce Oil Corp. v. Schacht, 75 Okla. 101, 181 Pac. 731(1919); Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
322 Humphreys Oil Co. v. Tatum, 26 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1928).
323 Swope v. Holmes, 169 La. 17, 124 So. 131 (1929); Amerada Petroleum
Corp. v. Sledge, 151 Okla. 160, 3 P.2d 167 (1931); Cox v. Sinclair Gulf
Oil Co., 265 S.W. 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
324 Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 55 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1932). See MER-
RILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES 401 (2d ed. 1940).
325 Drummond v. Alphin, 176 Ark. 1052, 4 S.W.2d 942 (1928).
326 Among late decisions are Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson, 271
F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1959); Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So. 2d
210 (1958).
327 See Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil
and Gas Lease in Texas, 11 TEXAS L. REV. 399, 450 (1933).
328 This I have discussed in MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS
LEASES 404 (2d ed. 1940).
329 See 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 121 (3d ed. 1939).
330 Texas Co. v. Mattocks, 211 Ark. 972, 204 S.W.2d 176 (1947); Stafford
v. Yerge, 139 Cal. App. 2d 851, 294 P.2d 721 (2d Dist. 1956); Whale v.
Rice, 173 Okla. 530, 49 P.2d 737 (1935).
331 Cf. Heller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N.E. 490 (1902).
332 Gillet v. Elnhurst Inv. Co., III Kan. 755, 207 Pac. 843 (1922) so holds,
but the opinion is not well-considered.
333 See discussion in MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES
397 (2d ed. 1940).
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It is frequent practice to insert in the lease a clause intended to
absolve the lessee-assignor from this responsibility.33 4
In some states, a great deal of importance is attached to the
distinction between an assignment, by which the lessee's whole
interest is transferred, and a sublease, by which the lessee cre-
ates a new tenancy, retaining in himself some part of the interest
vested by the lease.3 3 5 This is thought to have significance with
respect to the liabilities of the lessee336 and his transferee3 3 7 to
the lessor. Actually, the distinction has no relation to the reali-
ties of the oil business.338 It should not be applied to oil and gas
leases by any court which is not irrevocably bound thereto by
controlling decisions.3 39
The transfer may take the form of the assignment of the
lease as to certain strata340 or as to one substance, that is, a sep-
aration of oil rights from gas rights.3 41 The general principles
already discussed apply to such transfers.
We have seen that the lessor, by transferring his interest in
part, does not thereby increase the lessee's developmental obli-
334 Two examples follow: "An assignment of this lease, in whole or in
part, shall, to the extent of such assignment, relieve and discharge
lessee of any obligations hereunder, and, if lessee or assignee of part
or parts hereof shall fail or make default in the payment of the pro-
portionate part of the rentals due from such lessee or assignee or fail
to comply with any other provisions of the lease, such default shall
not affect this lease in so far as it covers a part of said lands upon
which lessee or any assignee thereof shall make payment of said rent-
als."
"Upon each assignment hereof, whether in whole or in part, the
assignor thereupon shall be released from any and all liability there-
after arising or accruing hereunder as to the portion assigned and,
should the owner of this lease, as to any portion of leased premises,
fail or make default in any of the covenants, conditions, or obligations
of LESSEE, express or implied, such failure or default shall not oper-
ate to defeat or affect this lease in so far as it covers any portion of
leased premises upon which the owner thereof shall have complied
with the terms and provisions of the lease."
335 Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163
(1937); Bond v. Midstates Oil Corp., 219 La. 415, 53 So. 2d 149 (1951);
Shearer v. United Carbon Co., 143 W. Va. 482, 103 S.E.2d 883 (1958).
336 See MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN Om AND GAS LEASES 398 (2d ed.
1940).
337 See M=ILL, op. cit. supra note 336, at 393.
338 See Merrill, The Partial Assignee-Done in Oil, 20 TExAs L. REV. 298,
332 (1942).
339 See MERRmL, COVENANTS IMPLIED n OIL A GAS LEASES 394 (2d ed.
1940); 3 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS 599 (perm. ed. 1958).
340 As in Carter Oil Co. v. McCasland, 190 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1951).
341 As in Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson, 271 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1959).
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gations.342 A few jurisdictions speak of the "divisibility" of the
obligation, 343 but they are in the minority. The hope of the lessor
in such cases lies in showing the court that the lessee has not
adequately performed his obligations with respect to the tract
as a whole.84 4
VI. POOLING AND UNITIZATION
Pooling means the bringing together of small separately
owned tracts to form a unit sufficient as a drainage area for a
single well.345  It avoids the necessity of drilling wells on each
individual tract, in order to realize for the respective owners a
return from their mineral interests. Thereby it conduces to the
more economic development of oil and gas areas. The most ec-
onomic and efficient development, and the utmost in conserva-
tion, however, can be achieved only through unitized operation
of each reservoir as an entity. The legal process by which such
a unitized operation of a reservoir underlying lands held in sep-
arate ownership is achieved is termed "unitization. ' 346
Pooling and unitization each may be achieved either by pri-
vate agreement or by legislative compulsion as an exercise of
the police power.3 47 Compulsory merging, of course, overrides
lease arrangements, and is in no way dependent upon lease terms.
We shall pass it by with no further comment.
Voluntary pooling or unitization may be achieved by the
common action of the holders of the working interests, without
the consent of their respective lessors.348  Such agreements,
however, cannot bind the lessors' interests, 34 9 and the resultant
342 Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 156 Kan. 367, 133 P.2d 95 (1943);
Cochran v. Gulf Ref. Co., 139 La. 1010, 72 So. 718 (1916); Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 194 Okla. 435, 152 P.2d 367 (1944).
343 Compton v. Fisher-McCall, 298 Mich. 648, 299 N.W. 750 (1941).
344 Hitt v. Henderson, 112 Okla. 194, 240 Pac. 745 (1925). Cf. Republic
Natural Gas Co. v. Baker, 197 F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1952).
345 See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERViS 184 (1957).
346 Id. 266.
34T Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U.S. 376 (1939); Hunter Co.
v. McHugh, 320 U.S. 222 (1943); Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada Petro-
leum Corp., 343 U.S. 390 (1952).
348 Farrell v. Simms, 209 La. 1072, 26 So. 2d 143 (1946); Beck v. Norbeck
Co., 116 Mont. 345, 151 P.2d 1014 (1944); Thomas v. Ley, 177 Okla.
150, 57 P.2d 1186 (1936).
349 Hunter v. Hussey, 90 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 1956); Knight v. Chicago
Corp., 144 Tex. 98, 188 S.W.2d 564 (1945).
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possibility of liability if those interests are harmed by the op-
erations makes this way of achieving merged operation undes-
irable in most instances. 350 Consequently, the search turns to-
ward some method of getting the mineral and royalty owners
to assent in a program of merged interests.
Immediately there comes to mind the device of getting all
the proprietors of the nonworking interests to join in a contrac-
tual assent to pooling or to unitization. This has its drawbacks,
however. Ordinarily it is impossible to secure assent in advance
of exploration or during the period of "flush" production.
3 51
The document must be carefully drawn with a view to all con-
tingencies and in the light of experience.35 2  The information
necessary for proper framing will not be available until the field
has been pretty well developed, and too, the time involved may
defeat realization of the values sought by the merger.
53
Because of this, it has become common to insert in oil and
gas lease forms some provision authorizing the lessee to combine
the leased premises with other properties. Forms vary, from
succinct and simple statements354 to those which are long, de-
350 See Merrill, Unitization Problems: The Position of the Lessor, 1 OiA.
L. REv. 119, 121 (1948); Merrill, Implied Covenants and Secondary Re-
covery, 4 OxLA. L. REv. 177, 182 (1951).
351 See Long, The Pooling Clause in an Oil and Gas Lease, 11 OKLA. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1958). This article, incidentally, is one of the most valuably
thoughtful surveys of the legal and practical problems connected with
the pooling clauses of oil and gas leases.
352 See Myers, Spacing, Pooling and Field-Wide Unitization, 18 Mss. L.J.
267, 274 (1947); King, Pooling and Unitization of Oil and Gas Leases,
46 McH. L. Rzv. 311, 330 (1948); Williams, The Negotiation and Prep-
aration of Unitization Agreements, SouTHwEsTEm LEGAL FouNDATioN
1ST ANNUAL INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAx 43 (1949).
353 See Long, supra note 351, at 4.
354 "It is further agreed that lessee may at any time without the consent
of lessors, consolidate, jointly operate, and develop this lease and the
land covered hereby with any other lease or leases covering any lot,
lots or parcels of land embraced within the outer boundary lines of
the J. W. Craig's Sub. of Block 19, Fruitland Addition to Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma.
"Lessee is hereby granted the right to pool or consolidate this
lease, the land covered by it, or any part thereof, with any other land,
lease, leases, mineral estates, or parts thereof, but only as to the gas
rights hereunder (excluding casinghead gas produced from oil wells)
to form one or more gas operating units of not more than 640 acres
each. Lessee shall file written unit designations in the county in which
the premises are located. Such units may be designated either before
or after the completion of wells. Drilling operations and production
on any part of the pooled acreage shall be treated as if such drilling
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tailed and complex. 355 As will be seen from the forms set out in
operations were upon or such production was from the land described
in this lease whether the well or wells be located on the land covered
by this lease or not. The entire acreage pooled into a gas unit shall
be treated for all purposes, except the payment of royalties on pro-
duction from the pooled unit, as if it were included in this lease. In
lieu of the royalties herein provided, lessor shall receive on produc-
tion from the unit so pooled only such portion of the royalty stipulated
herein as the amount of his acreage placed in the unit or his royalty
interest therein on an acreage basis bears to the total acreage so
pooled in the particular unit involved.
"The lessee is hereby authorized when in its discretion lessee
deems it necessary or convenient so to do, to unitize the leased prem-
ises, or any part thereof, with neighboring lands as to the production
of oil and gas or separately as to the production of either oil or gas.
Such unitization may be effected and evidenced: (a) By a contract
between lessee and the parties owning or interested in the oil and/or
gas or mineral rights in such neighboring lands and/or the oil and gas
lessee thereon; or (b) If the lessee herein holds an oil and gas lease,
or leases, covering such neighboring lands, by lessee executing and
filing of record a declaration of such unitization. If the lands to be
unitized fall in both classes above set out, then the lessee may use the
method and manner of effecting and evidencing the unitization ap-
plicable to the particular lands in each class as above provided. There-
after the commencement of any well or production of oil or gas on
any part of the unitized area shall have the same effect as to keeping
this lease in force as though such well were commenced or production
had on the premises hereby leased, and the royalty on the oil or gas
produced from the unitized area shall be payable to the lessors or
their assigns at the rate herein specified, but only in such proportion
as the interest or acreage owned by the lessors herein or their assigns
in the oil and/or gas or mineral rights in the land covered by this
lease shall bear to the entire interest or acreage in the oil and/or
gas or mineral rights in the unitized area.
"Lessee may pool and unitize land covered by this lease with any
other land, lease or leases lying within the outer boundaries of the
• ..acres described as ...whether such other land, lease or leases
are held by lessee or others. The entire acreage so pooled shall be
treated for all purposes as if it were included in one lease, and the
rental and royalties herein provided shall be shared by the lessors of
the pooled acreage in the proportion to which the mineral ownership
of each lessor, in acres, bears to the total pooled acreage."
.55 "Lessee is hereby granted the right to pool this lease or any portion
thereof, the land covered by it or any part, formation or zone thereof,
into a unit or units with any other lease or leases, mineral estates,
land or formation, zone or portions thereof for the production of oil
or gas, or of any liquid or gaseous hydrocarbon or substance covered by
this lease. The acreage of any unit so pooled shall not exceed by
more than ten per cent (10%) the greater of the following: six hun-
dred and forty acres, or the acreage prescribed by Federal law, State
law, order of a regulatory agency, executive order, rule or regulation
either as a spacing pattern for the drilling of wells in the field where
the leased premises are located, or as a basis for the allocation of a
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producing allowable based wholly or partly on acreage per well.
Lessee shall file written unit designations, reformations, contractions
or enlargements thereof in the office for recording deeds in the county
wherein the above land is situated. Such units may with the same
effect be formed, designated, reformed, contracted or enlarged either
before or after the completion of any producing well or wells.
"The oil or gas or substance covered by this lease and for the
production of which the pooled unit was formed, is referred to as
Unitized Substance, or Substances. Drilling or reworking operations
commenced or performed on the unit shall for all purposes be treated
the same as if actually commenced or performed on the herein leased
premises. Any well anywhere located upon the acreage pooled in the
unit and producing or capable of producing a Unitized Substance and
whether drilled before or after the designation of the unit shall for
all purposes be treated as if drilled, located on and producing from
the herein leased premises. The production of Unitized Substance or
Substances from any well or wells located on any lands in the unit
(whether or not such well or wells be on herein leased premises and
whether or not such well or wells be commenced or drilled before or
after the designation of the unit) shall after the effective date of the
unit for all purposes be treated as if such Unitized Substance or Sub-
stances were actually produced from the herein leased premises and
the entire acreage pooled into the unit shall be treated for all purposes
as if it were included in this lease, except, however, that in lieu of
the royalties elsewhere herein specified Lessor shall be entitled to
receive from any unit so pooled only such proportion of the royalty
stipulated herein as the amount of Lessor's interest in the acreage
placed in such unit bears to the total acreage included in such unit.
At any time, when there is not located on the pooled acreage a well
capable of producing any Unitized Substance in paying quantities, the
Lessee may terminate such unit by filing in such office for recording
deeds, a written declaration terminating such pooled unit, whereupon
such pooled unit shall cease to exist.
"Lessee, at its option, is hereby given the right and power at any
time and from time to time as a recurring right, either before or after
production, as to all or any part of the land described herein and as
to any one or more of the formations hereunder, to pool or unitize the
leasehold estate and the mineral estate covered by this lease with
other land, lease or leases in the immediate vicinity for the produc-
tion of oil and gas, or separately for the production of either, when
in lessee's judgment it is necessary or advisable to do so, and irre-
spective of whether authority similar to this exists with respect to
such other land, lease or leases. Likewise, units previously formed
to include formations not producing oil or gas, may be reformed to
exclude such non-producing formations. The forming or reforming
of any unit shall be accomplished by lessee executing and filing for
record a declaration of such unitization or reformation, which declara-
tion shall describe the unit. Any unit may include land upon which
a well has theretofore been completed or upon which operations for
drilling have theretofore been commenced. The entire acreage so
pooled and production, drilling or reworking operations anywhere on
such acreage shall be treated for all purposes except the payment of
royalties as if it were included in and were production, drilling or
reworking operations under this lease. In lieu of the royalties else-
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where herein specified, including shut-in gas royalties, lessor shall
receive on production from the unit so pooled royalties only on the
portion of such production allocated to this lease; such allocation shall
be that proportion of the unit production that the total number of
surface acres covered by this lease and included in the unit bears to
the total number of surface acres in such unit. In addition to the
foregoing, lessee shall have the right to unitize, pool, or combine all
or any part of the above described lands as to one or more of the
formations thereunder with other lands in the same general area by
entering into a cooperative or unit plan of development or operation
approved by any governmental authority and, from time to time, with
like approval, to modify, change or terminate any such plan or agree-
ment and, in such event, the terms, conditions, and provisions of this
lease shall be deemed modified to conform to the terms, conditions, and
provisions of such approved cooperative or unit plan of development
or operation and, particularly, all drilling and development require-
ments of this lease, express or implied, shall be satisfied by compli-
ance with the drilling and development requirements of such plan or
agreement, and this lease shall not terminate or expire during the
life of such plan or agreement. In the event that said above described
lands or any part thereof, shall hereafter be operated under any such
cooperative or unit plan of development or operation whereby the
production therefrom is allocated to different portions of the land
covered by said plan, then the production allocated to any particular
tract of land shall, for the purpose of computing the royalties to be
paid hereunder to lessor, be regarded as having been produced from
the particular tract of land to which it is allocated and not to any
other tract of land; and the royalty payments to be made hereunder
to lessor shall be based upon production only as so allocated. Lessor
shall formally express lessor's consent to any cooperative or unit plan
of development or operation by lessee and approved by any govern-
mental agency by executing the same upon request of lessee.
"Lessee is hereby granted the right to pool or unitize this lease,
the land covered by it or any part thereof with any other land, lease,
leases, mineral estates or parts thereof for the production of oil, liquid
hydrocarbons and all gases and their respective constituent products,
or any of them. Units pooled for oil hereunder shall not exceed forty
(40) acres plus a tolerance of ten per cent (10%) thereof, and units
pooled for gas hereunder shall not exceed six hundred forty (640)
acres plus a tolerance of ten per cent (10%) thereof, provided that if
any federal or state law, Executive order, rule or regulation shall
prescribe a spacing pattern for the development of the field or allo-
cate a producing allowable on acreage per well, then any such units
may embrace as much additional acreage as may be so prescribed
or as may be used in such allocation or allowable. Lessee shall file
written unit designations in the county in which the premises are
located. Such units may be designated either before or after the com-
pletion of wells. Drilling operations and production on any part of
the pooled acreage shall be treated as if such drilling operations were
upon or such production was from the land described in this lease
whether the well or wells be located on the land covered by this lease
or not. The entire acreage pooled into a unit shall be treated for all
purposes, except the payment of royalties on production from the
pooled unit, as if it were included in this lease. In lieu of the royalties
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the footnotes, some clauses authorize pooling only,s56 while others
are phrased broadly enough to permit unitization.3 57 Despite
some early doubts based largely on misconception of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, 358  the validity of these authorizations
seems established 359 and properly so.360
The clauses, it will have been noted, often place extremely
wide discretion in the lessee.36 1 To the extent that there are
express restrictions, an attempted unitization in excess of the
authority granted is invalid.3 62 In addition, there are judge-
made restrictions. The power must be exercised within a reason-
able time,36 3 which, in some jurisdictions,364 though not in all,3a 5
means before production is achieved on any of the tracts con-
cerned. It must be exercised, not alone in the lessee's interest,
but, based on implied covenant principles, with due regard to
the legitimate concerns of the lessor.36 6  All the following have
been recognized as legitimate considerations in support of an ex-
ercise of this authority: economical development and operation
herein provided, lessor shall receive on production from a unit so
pooled only such portion of the royalty stipulated herein as the amount
of his acreage placed in the unit or his royalty interest therein on an
acreage basis bears to the total acreage so pooled in the particular
unit involved."
356 Another example of such a clause is set forth in Diggs v. Cities Serv.
Oil Co., 241 F.2d 425, 426 (10th Cir. 1957).
357 For a judicially approved type of unitization clause, see Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926, 928 (10th Cir. 1954).
358 Cf. Carlson v. Tioga Holding Co., 72 N.W.2d 236 (N.D. 1955) where
an attempted unitization of undivided interests in separately owned
tracts was held invalid, principally because the trustee could not
alienate until the termination of the trust which would not come about
until failure of production throughout the area. Such a holding could
well be extended to any power to unitize based on leases with a
"thereafter" clause.
359 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954);
Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 173 Kan. 183, 245 P.2d 176 (1952).
360 See Kuntz, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Mineral Interests, 8
OKLA. L. REv. 183, 198 (1955).
361 It is unnecessary to make detailed specifications concerning the unit
to be set up. Tiller v. Fields, 310 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
362 Union Oil Co. v. Touchet, 229 La. 316, 86 So. 2d 50 (1956); Leopard
v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 220 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
363 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
364 Mallett v. Union Oil & Gas Corp., 232 La. 157, 94 So. 2d 16 (1957).
365 Gillham v. Jenkins, 206 Okla. 440, 244 P.2d 291 (1952); Tiller v. Fields,
310 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
366 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954);
Imes v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 184 Okla. 79, 84 P.2d 1106 (1938).
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of the area,367 wartime regulations,3 68 the exigencies of a drilling
program3 69 and conservation objectives.3 70 Apparently, in the
absence of express stipulation, the authority is not exhausted by
its first exercise, 37'1 although serious harm to the lessor's interest
may lead a court to disallow the reopening of a unit once set
up.
3 7 2
The ordinary terms of these provisions, as shown by the
samples already set out, make drilling or producing activities
anywhere on the created unit the equivalent of such action on
the leased tract. As a result, they are operative to extend the
lease, not only as to the area embraced within the unit,373 but
also as to portions of the leased premises omitted from the unit.374
The implied covenant obligations, however, continue with res-
pect to the ununitized portions, 375 so that the lessor is not left
entirely unprotected.
There are statutes authorizing various fiduciaries to enter in-
to agreements for pooling or unitization through proceedings in
courts of proper jurisdiction.3 76 A nice question arises whether,
under such statutes, the court is permitted to authorize the exe-
cution of a lease containing a power to pool or to unitize, or
whether it is limited to the approval or disapproval of a particu-
lar unitization or pooling project.877
The desirability of broad pooling or unitizing authority on
the part of the lessee is manifest. Should the lessor be advised
to grant such an authority? The answer in part depends upon
367 Boone v. Kerr-McGee Oil Indus., 217 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1954).
368 Gillham v. Jenkins, 206 Okla. 440, 244 P.2d 291 (1952).
369 Diggs v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 241 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1957).
370 Boone v. Kerr-McGee Oil Indus., 217 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1954).
371 Trawick v. Castleberry, 275 P.2d 292 (Okla. 1954).
372 Imes v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 184 Okla. 79, 84 P.2d 1106 (1938) (unfair
dilution by addition of tracts proved to be barren, apparently with
some interest in lessee).
373 McClain v. Harper, 206 Okla. 437, 244 P.2d 301 (1952).
374 Scott v. Pure Oil Co., 194 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1952); Trawick v. Castle-
berry, 275 P.2d 292 (Okla. 1954). This effect may be negated by ex-
press provisions in the lease. Broussard v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
160 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. La. 1958). The provision is set out in the re-
port of the case.
375 Gregg v. Harper-Turner Oil Co., 199 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1952); Buchanan
v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 218 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1955); Sunray Mid-
Continent Oil Co. v. McDaniel, 30 OKLA. B.A.J. 1055 (1959).
376 An example is NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 57-210 to -212.01 (Reissue 1960).
377 See Long, The Pooling Clause in an Oil and Gas Lease, 11 OKLA. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1958).
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the jurisdiction. In a state which considers that a pooling or
unitization agreement of any kind constitutes a cross convey-
ance, vesting an interest in each tract in each of the proprietors
of every other tract who become parties to the agreement,3"8 the
effect on the titles of the individual proprietors 37 9 and upon their
powers to maintain litigation affecting their individual inter-
ests 3 0 is so devastating that I would counsel strongly against
entering into any voluntary unitization or pooling whatever.3 81
Obviously, I would advise against placing a power to enter into
such an agreement into the hands of a lessee who might use it,
inadvertently and with good intention, to the lessor's detriment. It
is very doubtful whether, in such a jurisdiction, the judge-pro-
claimed limitations on the exercise of the power can afford an
adequate safeguard. 82
In other jurisdictions, where unitization or pooling is regard-
ed merely as a means of administering the development of petro-
liferous resources and of apportioning returns in aid of an eco-
nomical and conservative pattern of development,38 3 the ques-
tion is not so easily answered. There are strong reasons which
may make the speed and flexibility which the granting of this
authority places in the hands of lessees advantageous to the les-
sors.3 84 On the other hand, the very speed and flexibility of the
power render it subject to arbitrary use, and the judicial safe-
guards, like all such processes, are cumbersome, dilatory and
expensive. Moreover, these clauses usually confine the appor-
tionment of royalty to an acreage basis. If the merging is in
advance of production, this is inevitable. The lessor may not
wish to enter into such a gamble. He may prefer to be sure that
378 Tanner v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 20 Cal. 2d 814, 129 P.2d 383 (1942);
Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 431, 159 S.W.2d 472 (1942).
379 Renwar Oil Corp. v. Lancaster, 154 Tex. 311, 276 S.W.2d 774 (1955);
Matthews v. Landowners Oil Ass'n, 204 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947).
880 Sharpe v. Landowners Oil Ass'n, 127 Tex. 147, 92 S.W.2d 435 (1936);
Belt v. Texas Co., 175 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
381 See Merrill, Recent Unitization Cases, 6 OKLA. L. REV. 168, 171 (1953).
882 See what has happened to the supposed duty of utmost good faith
said to be owed by the executive right holder to his beneficiaries in
Archer County v. Webb, 338 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. 1960).
383 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954);
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., 185 La. 751,
170 So. 785 (1936); Sinclair Crude Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n,
326 P.2d 1051 (Okla. 1958).
384 See Long, The Pooling Clause in an Oil and Gas Lease, 11 OKLA. L.
REv. 1, 4 (1958).
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unproductive acreage does not share in the return from his land,
or that, if he has rich acreage, his return is not divided to in-
crease the yield to those whose land is less productive. If the
lessor desires to retain some voice in the extent to which he is
caught up into a communized venture, he should not execute a
lease with such a provision. In a state having procedures for
the compulsory institution of pooling or of unitization, the lessor
well may feel that he ought not to give the lessee the power to
establish them unilaterally. While there may be delay resulting
from resort to the administrative process,3 8 5 it also is true that
significant concerns of the lessor may be presented and may be
recognized as a result of this process.3 86
VII. REMEDIAL AND JUDICIAL
ASCERTAINMENT CLAUSES
A number of clauses have been devoted to relieving the
lessee from burdens related to remedies or to regulatory or other
activities.
One such provision requires notice to and opportunity for
performance by the lessee as a prerequisite to action against him
based on a theory of nonperformance of obligations under the
lease.387 The extent to which this is required in the absence of
stipulation is doubtful.388 The clause probably is intended to re-
move that doubt. The cases seem generally to give it effect as
written.3 8 9
385 Id.
886 See Merrill, Recent Unitization Cases, 6 OKLA. L. REV. 168, 176 (1953).
387 One such form reads: "In the event lessor considers that lessee has
not complied with all its obligations hereunder, both express and
implied, before production has been secured or after production has
been secured, lessor shall notify lessee in writing, setting out specif-
ically in what respects lessee has breached this contract. Lessee shall
then have sixty (60) days after receipt of said notice within which
to meet or commence to meet all or any part of the breaches alleged
by lessor. The service of said notice shall be precedent to the bringing
of any action by lessor on said lease for any cause, and no such action
shall be brought until the lapse of sixty (60) days after service of
such notice on lessee. Neither the service of said notice nor the doing
of any acts by lessee aimed to meet all or any of the alleged breaches
shall be deemed an admission or presumption that lessee has failed
to perform all its obligations hereunder."
88 See MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES ch. X (2d
ed. 1940).
389 See the recent discussion in Williams & Meyers, Forfeiture, Notice
and Demand and Judicial Ascertainment Clauses in Oil and Gas
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Allied to this is the so-called judicial ascertainment clause.39 0
While an early opinion questioned the validity of such a stipu-
lation on the ground that it interfered with the orderly adminis-
tration of justice by requiring piecemeal trials,391 the contention
is far fetched,3 92 and they have been enforced so often that there
now seems no reason to question their validity.m The judicial
ascertainment clause is available only to a lessee who has a re-
spectable, as distinguished from a factitious, ground of contro-
versy.3 94 Neither do they apply to cases where the contention is
that the lease has expired by its own terms.39 5
The decisions denying effect to various natural calamities 396
and governmental afflictions 397 as excuses for nonperformance
of lessees' obligations have stimulated the drafting of what is
commonly referred to as the "force majeure" clause.3 98 There
Leases, 1 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 41 (1961). Billeaud Planters, Inc. v.
Union Oil Co., 245 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1957) seems erroneous in applying
such a clause to relieve a lessee that must all along have known that
it was filching oil from beneath the leased premises through neighbor-
ing wells.
390 An example of phraseology: "This lease shall never terminate or be
forfeited or canceled in whole or in part, either during or after the
primary term hereof, for failure to perform any of its implied cove-
nants, conditions, or obligations until it shall have first been finally
judicially determined that such failure exists, and any decree of
termination, cancellation or forfeiture shall be in the alternative and
shall provide for termination, cancellation, or forfeiture unless Lessee
comply with the implied covenants, conditions, or obligations breached
within a reasonable time to be determined by the Court."
391 Frick-Reid Supply Corp. v. Meers, 52 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932).
392 See Merrill, Lease Clauses Affecting Implied Covenants, SOUTH-
WESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 2D ANNUAL INST. oN OIm & GAS L. &
TAx 141, 185 (1951).
393 Haynes v. Southwest Natural Gas Co., 123 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1941);
Steffes v. Allen, 295 Mich. 510, 295 N.W. 245 (1940).
394 Melancon v. Texas Co., 230 La. 593, 89 So. 2d 135 (1956).
395 Eitel v. Alford, 127 Colo. 341, 257 P.2d 955 (1943).
390 Baldwin v. Blue Stem Oil Co., 106 Kan. 848, 189 Pac. 920 (1920);
Logan v. Blaxton, 71 So. 2d 675 (La. Ct. App. 1954).
897 B. & B. Oil Co. v. Lane, 249 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1952) (war).
39s "When drilling, production or other operations are delayed, inter-
rupted or stopped by lack of water, labor material, inability to obtain
access to leased premises, fire, flood, war, rebellion, insurrection, riot,
strike, differences with workmen, failure of carriers to transport or
furnish facilities for transportation of any product produced here-
under, lack of available or satisfactory market, in Lessee's opinion,
for the oil or gas produced, or as a result of an order of any govern-
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has been little interpretation of the sweeping language of this
clause. The decisions have tended toward strict construction, in
accordance with a general judicial attitude.399 Thus excessive,
but seasonal, rain does not come within the exculpatory provi-
sions of such a clause. 40 0 Also, a court has refused to infer, with-
out proof, that the work would have been performed had the
weather been good.401 Governmental interference which the
lessee might have removed had he made the attempt is not an
excuse for inaction despite a "force majeure" clause.4 0 2 On the
other hand, one court seems to have construed such a clause as
permitting the lessee to suspend operations almost at will.40 3 In
view of the possibility of other such decisions, and particularly in
view of the tendency of draftsmen to concoct more strongly
worded clauses designed to give excuse for complying with every
act of government, no matter how illegal,40 4 it is my advice that
prospective lessors refuse to execute leases containing clauses ex-
cusing the lessee for nonperformance due to acts of government.
To the extent that such acts are legally binding, and not cap-
mental agency, (including but not limited to orders restricting pro-
duction) or as a result of any cause beyond the control of Lessee, the
time of such delay, interruption or stoppage shall not be counted
against the Lessee under any provision of this lease, and this lease
shall not terminate by reason of any such delay, interruption or
stoppage, and the period of such delay, interruption or stoppage shall
be added to the term of this lease."
399 See MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § 200 (2d
ed. 1940).
400 Logan v. Blaxton, 71 So. 2d 675 (La. Ct. App. 1954).
401 Illinois Mid-Continent Co. v. Tennis, 122 Ind. App. 17, 102 N.E.2d 390
(1951).
402 Baldwin v. Kubetz, 148 Cal. App. 2d 937, 307 P.2d 1005 (2d Dist. 1957).
403 Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Chromium Prods. Corp. 202 F.2d 664
(9th Cir. 1953).
404 "Compliance with any now or hereafter existing law enacted by Fed-
eral or State legislative authority, or with orders, judgments, decrees
or regulations made or promulgated by State or Federal courts, State
or Federal offices, boards, commissions or committees, purporting to
be made under authority of law, shall not constitute a violation of
the terms of this lease or be considered a breach of any obligation
herein, nor shall it constitute a cause for the termination, forfeiture,
reversion or revesting of any estate or interest hereby created, nor
shall compliance confer any right of entry or become the basis of an
action for damages or suit for the forfeiture or cancellation hereof,
and while any such purport to be in force and effect they shall, when
complied with, to the extent of such compliance, operate as a modifi-
cation of the terms and conditions of this lease where inconsistent
therewith."
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able of being modified or removed at the initiative of the lessee,
they probably should excuse nonperformance without need to
resort to contractual stipulation.40 5 If they are illegal 406 or are
capable of being modified by the lessee's stimulation,40 7 they
should not exculpate his inaction. The lessor ought not to make
any stipulation capable of being twisted by judicial interpreta-
tion into a waiver of this salutary principle.
VIII. CLAUSES DESIGNED TO CURE PROBLEMS ARISING
FROM SEPARATION OF THE LEASE BY HORIZONTAL
ASSIGNMENTS OR BY
PARTIAL POOLING OR UNITIZATION
Frequently production is obtained, or is obtainable, from
different subsurface levels, horizons or strata. It therefore
may be desirable to provide expressly in the lease that produc-
tion from one level or horizon during the primary term will not
perpetuate the lease as to another level or horizon beyond the
primary term. Ordinarily, as we have seen, an oil and gas lease
is extended beyond the primary term by a "thereafter" clause
if a producing well is obtained at any location on the surface of
the leased premises during the primary term.
Leases usually contain no prohibition against the recognized
practice of horizontal subsurface separation of formations by
partial assignment. Thus one person may have a valid operating
right on a designated horizon and another person on another
under the same base. Production may be obtained from one hor-
izon while the other horizon is not explored or is permitted to
remain nonproductive. This may tend to deny the lessor an op-
portunity to realize fully upon the productive capacity of his
land. While it is true that the implied covenant obligations,
heretofore mentioned, may afford the lessor some relief in such
a situation,408 the exact extent of this relief is not well defined.
405 Gray v. Cameron, 218 Ark. 142, 234 S.W.2d 769 (1951); Hunter Co.
v. Vaughn, 217 La. 459, 46 So. 2d 735 (1950); Superior Oil Co. v. Foote,
214 Miss. 857, 59 So. 2d 85, 37 A.L.R.2d 415 (1952).
406 Haby v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 228 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1955); Union
Pac. R.R. v. Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 131 Colo. 528, 284
P.2d 242 (1955); Marrs v. Railroad Comm'n, 142 Tex. 293, 177 S.W.2d
941 (1944).
407 See Merrill, Fulfilling Implied Covenant Obligations Administratively,
9 OKLA. L. REV. 125 (1956), for an exploration of the lessee's obliga-
tions in this respect.
408 See MERRILL, CovENANTs IMPLIED IN OnM AND GAS LEASES § 69 (2d
ed. 1940).
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Moreover, delay rental payments, and other obligations of the
lessee, may be absolved by the fact of production from one hor-
izon, while the other levels are held without development.
The same problems may arise where the leased premises are
pooled or unitized with other lands, or where a designated for-
mation under the leased premises is pooled or unitized by agree-
ment or by governmental order, with parts of the same forma-
tion in a common source of supply underlying other lands.40 9 In
this respect, it is immaterial whether the pooling or unitization
is voluntary or is compulsory.
It may be desirable, therefore, to provide expressly in the
lease that the subsurface separation or segregation of mineral
rights by levels, horizons or formations, or the pooling or uniti-
zing of part of the acreage with other tracts, shall constitute a
severance of the basic lease so that each such separated formation
or acreage thereafter shall be treated as though covered by a sep-
arate lease containing all of the provisions and stipulations of
the basic lease. This is believed to constitute a simpler and more
effective way of solving the difficult problems arising from the
severance of the operating interest as to different levels, or from
the inclusion of part, only, of the leased premises in the same
unit with lands of other owners, wholly strangers to the lease,
than has been achieved by provisions, commonly referred to as
"Pugh clauses," which have been employed for that purpose in
some states.
410
409 See MERRILL, Op. cit. supra note 408 at 215 (Supp. 1959).
410 See lease forms set out or summarized in Broussard v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co., 160 F. Supp. 905, 907 (W.D. La. 1958), aff'd. 265 F.2d 221
(5th Cir. 1959); Rogers v. Westhoma Oil Co., 291 F.2d 726, 730 (10th
Cir. 1961); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Hutchins, 217 Miss. 636, 64 So.
2d 733, 738 (1953).
